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The evaluation process currently planned for the National
Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, is examined and a
methodology proposed for evaluating unit tactical
proficiency from the data accumulated. The concept of a
Training Readiness Profile (TRP) is suggested as a concise
method for assisting the Battalion Commander and his
subordinates in meeting the training objectives of FM 71-1,
FM 71-2, and ARTEP 71-2. This concept is applicable to
Armored and Infantry battalions and to their training
programs as currently specified under Department of the Army
doctrine. This methodology is compatible with the automated
information retrieval systems currently being specified for
installation at the National Training center.
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I • THE EVALUATION OF .TRAINING FOR GROO ND COMBAT
The mission of the United States Army is to fight in
ground combat and win. From FM 100-5, O peration s [Ref . 1 ],
"The Army's primary objective is to win the land ba ttle
—
to fight and win in battles, large ancl small, against
whatever foe, wherever we may be sent to war." [Ref.
1:pg. 1-1]
This mission stands essentially unchanged since the earliest
days of the Republic, yet the world has changed dramatically
in the intervening years. Increasingly complex technology
has expanded the range and lethality of all weapons on the
battlefield to such an extent that:
"We can expect very high losses to occur in short periods
of time. Entire forces could be desroyed quickly if they
are improperly employed. . . " (emphasis added) [Ref. 1:pg.
Therefore, now as never before, the Army must train in
peacetime to be victorious without the traditional long
period of mobilization which has characterized the entry of
the U.S. into all its other wars.
"Today the U.S. Army must, above all else, prepare to win
the first battle of the next war." ["Ref. 1:pg. 1-1]
Within this century, training in the United States Army
has been centered around the mobilization models first
employed in WWI by the newly formed U.S. General Staff.
This traditional model assumed that in the conduct of war, a
11

long period of time would be availible to raise, equip, and
train an army while the continental U.S. remained protected
by the formidable barriers of the Atlantic and Pacific
oceans. This training followed a predictable cycle; the
small standing Army formed a cadre-nucleus around which
units were constructed from a large pool of conscripts.
Training would begin with the individual combat skills,
progress to squad, platoon, and company skills, and then
these units would be aggregated to form regiments,
divisions, and higher echelons, which proceeded through
their own cycle of training and exercise. At the completion
of this process, units were tested, and if judged fit,
deployed to combat theaters.
This cycle worked admirably in WWII and enabled the U.S.
to create a large and efficient war machine quickly. As
this was a proven system, it formed the basis of all Army
training until the early 1970 1 s. At that point in time, in
its final form, Army training consisted of the cycle as
depicted in Figure 1.
Each stage was defined as listed below and the contents
of each segment specified by an Army Training Program (ATP)
which outlined the subjects to be taught in training, the
number of hours to be spent in training, and the applicable
12
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Figure 1: The Army Training Cycle (Obsolete)
resources and references to be used. The completion of a
stage was evaluated by a graded test.
BCT: Basic Combat Training- This training instilled the
fundamentals of infantry combat to newly accessed
personnel. [Ref. 2:pg. 19]
AIT: Advanced Individual Training- Usually conducted in a
formal setting at an institution which resulted in the
award of a Military Occupation Specialty (MOS) . [Ref.
2:pq. 19]
At this stage an individual was assigned to a unit. Here
the cycle began again with:
BUT: Basic Unit Training- The initial unit training
designed to insure that sguads, platoons, and
Company/Battery/Troops can accomplish their TO&E missions.
This phase, and all others, culminated in an Army Training
Test (ATT) [Ref. 2:pg. 19].
pha
2:pg. 19]
Finally, units progressed to the maneuver phase where joint
combat arms maneuver characterized the training. This was:
13

ORT: Operational Readiness Training- Training designed to
maintain the highest possible state of combat proficiency.
[ Ref . 2: pg. 21 ]
At this point, a unit was considered to be deployable and
trained. Testing by ORTT (Operational Readiness Training
Test) was regularly accomplished in order to determine if
this status was maintained.
This system was fatally flawed, however. Under the
pressures of personnel turbulence created by the Vietnam
War, standards of training could not be maintained in an
orderly cycle and unit readiness suffered greatly. When
this deficiency was coupled with the need to maintain
standing U.S. forces at peak readiness all of the time, and
not just for a short period of time following the completion
of a training cycle, it became clear that a reform of the
Army training structure was necessary. In order to affect
this reform, the Board for Dynamic Training was constituted
in 1971 at the direction of the the Chief of Staff of the
Army (CSA) and reported its conclusions on 17 Dec 1971 to
the CSA regarding Army training. From these conclusions the
concept of performance-oriented training was born. [Ref. 3]
Performance-Oriented Training (POT) was designed to do
away with the old mobilization cycle of training. In it, a
soldisr was required to learn by doing a task under a given
14

set of conditions to a specified standard. The previous ATP
had specified only hours of exposure to training which, as
any noncommissioned officer (NCO) knows, does not guarantee
the absorption of the skill being taught by the soldier.
Although "hands-on training" by doing had been the teaching
policy for many years in the Army, this new method
emphasized the attainment of a standard as the final goal,
as opposed to the simple completion of the requisite number
of hours of training with or without acquiring the desired
skill. Under the POT program training would continue (by
doing) until the desired standard was achieved. This
concept was such a dramatic departure from previous Army
practice that the program took several years to introduce to
the field.
This philosophy was refined and promulgated to the field
Army through FM 21-6, How to Prepare and Conduct Military
Training, 3 Nov 1975 [Ref. 4]. FM 21-6 officially made POT
Army doctrine. Trainers were defined as those:
"Whose duties include the requirement to prepare, conduct,
and evaluate training..." [Ref. 4:pg. 2]
and these trainers were instructed that:
"The last element of the training objective which you must
develop is the training standard. These are needed to
insure that the soldiers undergoing training will be able
to perform the commanders objectives... Training
standards are normally expressed in terms of
measurement... or in terms of specific procedures which
must be followed..." [Ref. 4:pg. 13]
15

Thus, the key to the training system as it stands today in
the Army is the training standard. The initial question
then facing the unit trainer is how well does the soldier,
or collectively his unit, need to be trained? Beyond this
question of basically how good is good enough, lies the yet
more difficult question: hew do you evaluate the
accomplishment of the training standard, particularly for
large units? It has been shown that setting the standard is
difficult enough; how do you determine if men, units, and
weapons are capable of accomplishing it? For larger
elements, given the intangible nature of war, this question
becomes a crucial issue, and one very difficult to answer.
A. THE PROBLEM: THE EVALUATION OF TRAINING STANDARDS FOR
LARGE UNITS
With the dramatic shift from the accomplishment of
training programs to the accomplishment of traininq
standards, the Army incurred a new burden. Previously an
ATP (or any cycle of an ATP) could be evaluated on a graded
basis by administering an ATT to the unit. This could no
longer suffice as an evaluation technique, for the
prescribed traininq objective could only be considered
reached when the unit or individual could perform the
specified task to the given standard. The reliance of a
16

unit on a repetitive cycle of "Train-Test" in lockstep
fashion was broken. In its place, a new system for training
management was prescribed. In the introduction of this
system the Army specified a cycle of "Train-Evaluate-Train"
which encompassed the new philosophy that training in
general should be an iterative learning experience. TC
21-5-7, Training Mana gement in Bat talions [Hef. 5], was
issued in December 1977 to introduce the new cycle (see
Figure 2)
.
This general concept of training required action by two
agencies: the O.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC) and the training combat unit. TBADOC provided the
defined tasks, conditions and standards to the units through
the medium of the Army Training and Evaluation Program
(ARTEP) [Ref. 6] and with the ARTEP as a guide it became a
unit responsibility to complete the iterative "Train-
Evaluate-Train" cycle. This concept also applied to
individual, collective, and unit training (see Figure 3).
However, moves taken to decentralize training in the
early 1970 , s [Ref. 2:pg. 4] effectively devolved this cyclic
responsibility entirely to the battalion level. TC 21-5-7
states bluntly:
"The clear intent of the policy of decentralization is to



































Figure 2: The General Concept of Training
battalion is the lowest echelon at which there is a staff
to assist with such (training) duties." [Ref. 5:pg. 20]
Those duties were multitudinous, but most importantly, they
stated that the battalion headquarters: "Assigns tasks for
training and evaluates results." [Ref. 5:pg. 20]
Thus, unless carefully monitored through external ARrEP
evaluations, the battalion became a training entity subject
to its own set of training standards. In theory, external




















































































Figure 3: The Concept of Training at Levels
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headquarters or higher echelon. Due to the number of
evaluator personnel needed to administer an AfiTEP, such
events are usually scheduled by a division which employs
another battalion's command group as e valuators. This
perpetuates a vicious cycle; if one battalion is below
standard, it cannot evaluate another battalion beyond its
own level of competence. Hence the Army wide standard once
envisioned for all units becomes less and less attainable as
evaluation skills remain linked to the training level of
other sister battalions. It thus becomes quite easy for two
armored divisions, as an example, to report the same level
of training readiness in all honesty and yet have totally
disparate capabilities.
This situation becomes all the more critical when it is
realized that the ARTEP tasks and standards are vague, and
are frequently interpreted differently by individuals of
varying skill levels. As an example, for a combat-ready
tank and mechanized infantry battalion task force, (Level 1)
the evaluation standards for the performance of a hasty
attack are as follows:
"b. Coordination of artillery, mortars, air defense,
tactical air, engineers, and attack helicopters will
support the scheme of maneuver. Maneuver units respond to
task force commander's orders using overwatch positions,
maximum suppressive fires, and the terrain for protection
from opposing force fire.
20

c. Task force maintains the momentum of the attack and
retains the initiative, aggressively seeking the opposingforced weakness. Suppressive fires will be coordinated
to neutralize the opposing force's ability to react. Task
force assets will be concentrated to overwhelm the
opposing force at selected locations and control key
terrain features.
d. Objective is secured within a reasonable time without
sustaining excessive personnel and equipment losses.
(Evaluator judgment.)" [Ref. 6:pg. 8-2-2]
The use of such phrases as "coordination ...will support the
scheme of maneuver" and "task force maintains (the)
momentum of the attack and retains the initiative" is not
conducive to exacting evaluation. Such words can mean many
things to many people. Even scholars of war and veterans of
combat can argue justifiably over the definition of
"retaining the initiative". Such descriptors are, in many
cases, unintelligible to junior officers and NCOs with no
combat experience. Yet these individuals are most often
directly involved with the evaluation of sister elements in
the accomplishment of an ARTEP.
Clearly then, although the concept of "Train-Evaluate-
Train" is sound in theory, it lacks in the execution of the
required evaluation. The problem, indeed, is two-fold: the
establishment of accurate and concise training standards is
extremely difficult to do in practice; but even more
seriously, the evaluation of such standards by the untrained
eye of an observer whose own experience and training may be
21

no better (and indeed, may be worse) than that of the
individuals being evaluated provides little tangible
information about the unites real combat capability. Some
current training programs are directed toward alleviating
this deficiency; one in particular , the National Training
Center at Ft. Irwin, California, may hold the key for
breaking the vicious cycle of half-competent evaluation.
B. CURRENT TRAINING EVALUATION METHODS
The methods used to evaluate training accomplishments
are fairly limited today. Many of them date back centuries
to the simple concept of drill; others involve laser
technology and fast computers. The training systems
available to unit commanders at the present fall into three
basic categories and possess varying degrees of exactness in
evaluation. They can be classified from highest to lowest
in terms of evaluating capability as the Skill Qualification
Test (SQT) -Crew Drill-ARTEP hierarchy, the Multiple
Integrated Laser Engagement Sysytem (MILES) training device
(including all such variants of a hit/kill system) and
various field maneuvers, such as the Field Training Exercise
(FTX) , the Command Post Exercise (CPX) , and the Tactical
Exercise Without Troops (TEWT) .
22

1 • The SQT-Crew Erill^ABTEg^ierarchy.
Most organizations are constructed of vertical
hierarchies and the Army is no exception to this rule. With
the introduction of POT and the destruction of the old
training cycle, certain vacuums were formed in the
hierarchial progression of training from individual to unit.
















Figure 4: The SQT-Crew Drill-ARTEP Hierarchy
termed the SQT-Crew Drill-ARTEP hierarchy (see Figure 4).
With respect to individual training, the Army has published
the Soldier's Manual £Ref. 7 ] as a source document for The
23

Skill Qualification Test, which is a POT version of the old
MOS (Military Occupation Specialty) Test designed tp
evaluate individual skills. This test is reasonably well
structured, that is, the performance standards are
quantifiable in terms of a go/no go performance. Thus, tne
SQT evaluates individual training by asking the soldier to
perform a series of unambiguous mostly physical tasks which
are graded either pass or fail. 1
In the intermediate range of training crews, squads,
and small collective units, the Army has no formal
evaluation system, although the Army Research Institute for
the Behaviorial and Social Sciences (ARI) has been
tentatively tasked with arranging a "squad battle drill"
program. 2 Several informal evaluation systems do exisz which
are fairly quantitative despite their lack of formal
institutional standing. Examples of such evaluations are
tank gunnery evaluations (Tank Table VIII) which require a
quantitative passing score for crew performance; infantry
machine-gun crew qualification standards, artillery gun crew
l It appears at the time of this writing that the
Congress will refuse further funding for the SQT program.
What impact this will have upon future individual training
evaluaxion is unclear at this time.
2 Based on a conversation with Dr. J.Banks of ARI. June
1981. The tasking is to develop a series of standardized
exercises for small units, initially infantry squads, to




shooting standards, and the like. All of these evaluations
are slightly less quantitative than the SQT (there is no way
to evaluate the driver's shifting skill, for example, on
Tank Table VIII by other than the fact that the tank
proceeded downrange from target to target) but nonetheless,
all evaluations of this sort result in a quantitative score
against which a standard can be adjudged.
The final segment of this heirarchy is the
previously discussed ARTEP. The ARTEP itself is segmented
into platoon, company, and battalion portions, most of which
rely on a high degree of subjectivity in their assessments.
The inherent weaknesses of the ABTEP have already been
discussed in the previous section, and generally these
weaknesses apply to all echelons of the ARTEP with some
degree of increasing subjectivity and ambiguity as the unit
grows larger. This concept of a hierarchy is summarized by
Figure 4, showing the direction of increasing subjectivity
in evaluation.
2. CPX,_FTX, TEWT, and Other Field Mane uver
This family of exercises, which consist mostly of
field maneuver without an explicit opponent can be
evaluative or educational. Command Post Exercises (CPX) and
Tactical Exercises Without Troops (TEWT) are intended to
25

train staffs and commanders without the expense of placing
troops in the field. Such exercises are beneficial ro the
leaders involved, but when these maneuvers are made into
evaluations they are almost wholly subjective and, in fact,
are missing the few benefits of the vague ARTEP system in
that they totally lack established tasks, conditions, and
standards. They also suffer from an additional weakness of
possessing fewer observers than the normal ARTEP. Thus, for
evaluative purposes, the CPX and TEWT offer less value than
the ARTEP.
The field training exercise (FTX) suffers from the
same inherent weakness when used as an evaluation. FTX's
are quite often "canned" with little or no free play, and
provide scant opportunity for any worthwhile evaluation of a
unit's combat capabilities. Most often the FTX is used as a
tool for "exercising" the assets of a division by forcing
the service support units to operate in the field for
several days. FTX's in their structured, scripted form
offer very little training to combat elements and cannot be




3. Th e MILES Tra ining Device
The MILES (Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement
System) training device is not an evaluation methodology in
itself but rather is a tool to be used in conjunction with
other foras of training to increase realism and thus enhance
evaluation. MILES consists of varying types of eye-safe
lasers which can be fitted to most Army direct fire weapons
from the M16 rifle to the 105mm tank gun. These devices are
sound actuated, requiring the soldier to possess a blank
round of ammunition and a functioning weapon in order to
trigger the laser. This forces units to accurately perform
maintenance and supply functions in real time. Each player
in a MILES exercise is then fitted with sensors which can
detect the strike of another MILES laser beam on the
individual item, be it a single foot soldier or a tank,
truck, etc. If a kill is registered, it is signified in
various ways. Should an infantryman be "shot", for example,
an audible tone sounds to indicate that he is a casualty ana
his MILES weapon is rendered inoperative. For a larger item
such as a tank or APC , the kill indicator is appropriately
larger; a smoke grenade is set off and a flashing signal
started in addition to the instrumented weapon being
rendered inoperative. A "dead" MILES system can only be
21

reactivated by a controller key device. In this manner the
system can inflict realistic firepower casualties upon a
player unit, and so represent combat losses. Weapon lasers
are also coded internally within the beam to reflect weapon
type. As an example of this it would be impossible to kill
a tank with the beam of an M16 coded laser, while a TOW
coded beam could inflict such a casualty. The MILES
supporting software also contains a mini-computer which
randomly induces a miss based on the actual probability of
kill of the firing weapon. Thus, although it is easier to
aim the laser and strike a sensor than it is to strike the
target with a real round, the system automatically induces
realistic weapon performance to simulate the effect of real
fire from the given weapon.
MILES promises to add a degree of realism to
training exercises such as has never before been known.
Having the ability to "kill" an opponent greatly increases
the desire of troops to wholeheartedly participate in mock
battles, while possessing the ability to be "killed" causes
them to seek cover more effectively and learn more quickly
the price of their mistakes. 3 Therefore, the MILES sys-em
3For an excellent discussion of the learning rate
increase attributable to hit/kill systems see tne REALTRAIN
validation studies of the ARI (References 8,9,10, and 11).
28

can be seen as a multiplier of learning effects in training,
but contains only an indirect methodology for evaluation.
When utilized within the frameworic of an ARTEP style
evaluation, it dramatically increases the degree of
objectivity in the evaluation by removing the need for a
subjective guess at casualties during a force-on-force
exercise.
C. THE SHORTFALL: THE NEEDS OF EVALOATION VERSOS THE
CONSTRAINTS OF TRAINING
In considering the weaknesses of the current Army
training systems it becomes obvious that there is a dramatic
shortfall between the the theory of the train-evaluate-train
cycle and the hard realities of current training
constraints. The lack of dedicated evaluator personnel
forces the use of sister unit peers as pro tempore
evaluators; the lack of a dedicated opposing force (OPFOR)
utilizing threat tactics results in sister battalions
providing the aggressors in training, causing US units to
train against OS tactics; and finally, the vagueness of the
tasks and standards in the current ARTEP # s of large combat




These shortfalls have not gone unnoticed in the Army
training community. Afil was tasked in 1976 to evaluate the
REALTRAIN system, a precursor to the MILES which utilized
only optical spottings to provide "kill" information. In
1977 and 1978, tests were conducted to study the learning
effect of this system upon troops in training. In
constructing these rests, Scott, aeliza, and others
effectively pinpointed the necessary elements to be added to
the training system in order to obtain statistically
reliable information regarding learning effect. [Refs.
8,9,10,11]
Their methodology for eliminating the subjectivity of
traditional Army training methods consisted of a four-fold
approach: better determination of terminal mission outcoae
(mission accomplishment) through the use of hit/kill systems
(REALTRAIN or MILES) ; the elimination of the vague task
descriptions in the ARTE? through the determination of
intermediate subtasks (top-down analysis of combat
processes) ; the use of dedicated OPFOR to provide realistic
aggressors; and the use of event-specific trained evaluators
to insure standardized evaluations. [Ref. 8, p. 1-4] This
methodology will be examined in detail.
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1 . Improved Dete r mination of Mission Outcom e
The lack of an objective method for determining
mission accomplishment in an ARTEP is probably the program's
biggest weakness. In testing the effect of the HEALTRAIN
system, Scott, Meliza, et al., agreed that:
"The ARTEP initially suffered from some critical
weaknesses; one was the inability to objectively determine
tactical mission outcomes. However, the introduction of
tactical engagement simulation training methods such as
capability to conduct two-sided, free-play tactical
exercises with credible casualty assessment and weapons
signature effects, and a high degree of realism." [Ref.
8:pg. 1]
This problem can then, for most practical purposes be
considered to be solved if units engaged in training
utilized the MILES system. The only major weakness
remaining in the representation of weapons effects is in the
play of indirect fire, as the effect of artillery upon
troops during training still cannot be adequately simulated.
For all other purposes, assuming all combatant elements
possess the system during training, MILES will effectively
determine mission outcome just as real battle would by
demonstrating who-killed-who in combat.
2 • ^imination_of Vague Tasks Through Subtask Analysis
The second major obstacle to effective evaluation
proved to be lack of detail concerning the combat processes:
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"A second major weakness in the ARTEP is a general
superf iciality, which results in inadequate guidance for
Army trainers. .. If a unit fails to accomplish its mission,
this general guidance gives the trainer no help indetermining reasons for failure." [Ref. 8:pg. 1]
In order to measure task performance accurately more
concrete, identifiable subtasks had to be generated and
measured. These were defined in the following way:
"Consistent with the performance-oriented, criterion-
referenced approach, critical intermediary tasks are
defined as those that substantially increase the
probability of mission accomplishment." [Ref. 8:pg. 2]
The steps taken to identify these tasks were:
"(a) identification of candidate intermediate tasks;
(b) development of objective measures of proficiency for
these tasks;
(c) determination of the test conditions necessary to
gather these data reliably;
(d) correlation of intermediate task proficiency with
mission outcomes;
(e) identification of those tasks which correlate most
highly with mission outcomes." [Ref. 8:pg. 2]
This procedure essentially constituted a top-down analysis
of the given mission, in this case a squad movement to
contact (this test was repeated later for a tank platoon) .
The key point here is that once sufficient detail regarding
the combat processes was established, measures of
effectiveness for each subtask could be devised (see Figure
5) . Thus, accurate identical assessments of performance
could then be attained for each replication. This forms the
basis for constructing statistically reliable data; as much
subjectivity as possible has been eliminated from the ARIEP
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AT PHASE LINE "A"
17. Call NCS when point crosses
phase line "A".
18. From phase line "A" to potential
threat, how many times did the element
leader communicate with the squad?
19. Are 3 or more men in your element
within 10 meters of one another?
20. Number of men in your element with
which your element leader has visual
contact. (Enter "x" if you could
not observe.)
21. How far is point ahead of squad?
(Enter "x" if not observed.)
22. Was the element leader part of the
point?
23. Is point man covered by at least
one man?
21. Number of men in your element moving












Figure 5: An Example of Subtask MOE # s for a Squad Mission
evaluation by the use of subtasks. (Dr. Scott, et al,
eventually analyzed this data using Tukey»s HSD* test and
constructed standard Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) tables to
support their conclusions [Ref. 8:pp. 153-154].) The value
of this procedure did not escape the personnel at ARI;
"The payoff from this research should be empirical
identification and validation of critical intermediate
Tukey's Honest Significant Difference Test (sometimes
called the w procedure). This is a multiple comparison
test. It is designed for making all pairwise comparisons




tasks as well as determination of objective measures.These measures of task proficiency and measurementprocedures can be incorporated into the ARTEP. "[ Ref . 8: pg.
3 • The Use of a Dedicated OPFOR
In order to provide the necessary consistency of
response to the tested units (squad, platoon) a dedicated
OPFOR was used in each test to insure the opposition would
be reasonably constant. This gave each tested unit the same
experience and allowed the measurement of learning effect
between RE ALTRAIN-trained units and traditionally (ARTEP
only) trained units. This procedure would also allow , on a
large scale such as in battalion vs. battalion encounters,
the application of appropriate OPFOR tactics to training
units. This effect is significant, for in deciding to
establish the NTC the Army has relied heavily on Navy and
Air Force experience with the use of trained OPFOR:
training for dogfights with North Vietnamese MIG's. The
answer, TAC discovered, was to establish squadrons
equipped with aircraft which resembled the MIG in size and
operating capability, manned by pilots trained in Soviet-
style tactics. The U.S. Navy had used this technique
since 1969, and its pilots so trained, out-performed TAC
sixfold in ratio of kills to losses." [Ref. 12:pg. 3]
The necessity for utilizing a dedicated OPFOR employing
enemy tactics is obvious if it is desired to duplicate the













Figure 6: The Learning Effect of Battle
"Tha battle statistics indicate to TAC that combat is a
powerful trainer—whereas American pilots in their first
combat engagement have had only a 40 percent chance of
surviving, by their tenth engagement their chances of
winning had increased to 90 percent." [Ref. 12:pg. 2]
Therefore, the use of special OPFOR troops in evaluating
training for OS units is not a luxury, but rather a
necessity: it duplicates, as nearly as possible, the
learning effect of combat and allows for the replication of




4 • The tJse of Trained Professional Evaluato rs
The major reason for the use of trained evaluators
in the REALTRAIN tests was to insure that all test
procedures and scenarios were accurately replicated [ Ref
.
8:pg. 7]. The use of such evaluators at least insures a
degree of consistency. On a larger scale, the use of
trained evaluators in ARTEP type exercises for battalion
sized units would accomplish the same thing, i.e. insure
replicability, but also prevent the other major weakness of
the ARTEP from appearing: peers would not evaluate elements
of like skill or ability. With time and practice through
training, even a junior evaluator could accurately report on
the specific tasks for which he is trained, thus eliminating
the blind- leading (evaluating) -the-blind effect common to
the usual ARTEP. The degree of evaluation possible under
this system is a great deal more incisive than that of the
traditional ARTEP method.
The end result of this four-fold approach to
improving evaluation is the shortfall: the amount of effort
needed to bridge the gap between what is currently available
due to the constraints of training, and what is necessary to
produce a statistically reliable evaluation of training.
These shortfalls have been bridged by the creation of the
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National Training Center (NTC) , for all the elements
indigenous to the approach used by ARI are contained in the
structure of training and evaluation conducted at the NTC.
This is an exciting fact, for it establishes a statistically
reliable training evaluation for the first time on a large-
unit scale. A background disscussion of the NTC • s technical
capabilities follows, in order that its capacity for
significantly improved evaluation may be better understood.
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II . THE STATISTIC AL_E VALUATION. OF_I'RAINING
The National Training Center has been established to
train the heavy battalion task force in such a way that it
cannot be done at the unit home station. To achieve this
end it quite rightly relies upon the train-evaluate-train
model of learning as previously discussed. Although MILES
and other training devices undoubtedly provide a quantum
improvement in the quality of training at the NTC, such
devices are being packaged for use at the home station. The
key then, to the uniqueness of the NTC lies in the quality
of its evaluation process. This, in effect, separates it
from the usual ARTEP style training conducted at the unit
home station. Given the essential elements of proper
tactical training evaluation as formulated by Scott, Meliza,
Banks and others at ARI, can the NTC provide information
about the tactical performance of units that will bear
statistical scrutiny?
Indeed, the answer to this question must be yes, for the
essential methodology used by ARI to evaluate field training
exists at the NTC. A hit/kill system to accurately reflect
the casualties of war is utilized while a dedicated OPFOR
element provides realistic opposition to the friendly unit.
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A cadre of trained, professional controller/evaluators
provide the necessary subjective input to the evaluation
system, and are augmented by position location systems that
are more accurate than the human senses. In effect, the
amount of information being extracted from a unit training
session is sufficiently reliable at this point to provide
the basis for a proper training (learning effects)
evaluation.
A completed top-down analysis of the large unit combat
process also serves to provide the necessary lattice of
subtasks to conduct meaningful evaluations. This
"measurement of evaluation" methodology is discussed in
detail in the Appendices. However, the existence of
reliable data does not insure its efficient use; a
methodology must exist in order to utilize this data
effectively in after-action reviews (AAR) and for later
provision in a take-home package to assist unit training.
The current system of NTC feedback as designed has some
weaknesses
.
A. PROVIDING THE BATTLEFIELD: AN OVERVIEW OF THE NTC
The National Training Center concept was approved in
1977 to fulfill a pressing need within the Army. Due to
rapid advances in weaponry the Army in the late 1970*3 found
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itself unable to fully exercise units to their maximum
capabilities. Realistic large-scale live fire exercises
became impossible due to the range of new weapons, while the
use of full electronic warfare (EW) or
chemical/biological/radiological (CBR) capabilities posed
dangers or unacceptable inconveniences to the surrounding
civilian areas. In addition, the creation of standing OPFOR
units, the use of professional training evaluators and the
integration of engagement simulation technologies into large
scale maneuvers proved to be prohibitively expensive if
these systems were to be deployed at individual unit home
stations. Thus, in order to provide these enhancements to
unit training, the concept of having a National Training
Center was born; all of these training requirements could be
incorporated into a single station where units could be
rotated to in order to train properly (see Figure 7)
.
1 • The Training Environment
The objective of the NTC is to:
"Provide a facility where heavy battalion task forces,
controlling brigade headquarters, and supporting units can
undergo essential ccmbat arms training that cannot be
accomplished at home stations due to physical limitations
and prohibitive cost of providing a realistic training
environment." [Ref. 13:pg. 1]
As a secondary objective, data from the NTC will be used to
improve current Army procedures and assist in new combat
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RELATIONSHIP OF INCREASE IN UNIT PROFICIENCY. TO




















Realism of exercise environment
Figure 7: The Increase in Proficiency vs Exercise Realise
developments [Ref. 13:pg. 1]. Training at the NIC is based
on the "Train-Evaluate-Train cycle", with emphasis on the
feedback to units to provide maximum learning and to assist
in later home-station follow-up training. The training
emphasis is placed on heavy battalions and developing their
ability to "shoot, move, and communicate." To this end the








Instrumentation [Ref. 14:pg. 1-3]
Although instrumentation is heavily relied on for analysis
of the exercises and for providing feedback to the training
units, the accomplishment of training itself is paramount;
"The training environment will be paramount at the NTC.
Data collection will be secondary to accomplishing unit
training objectives." [Ref. 13:pg. 2]
The evaluation of unit training at the NTC will be in
accordance with the appropriate AUTEP with concentration on





Planning [Ref. 14:pg. 1-5]
The structure of activity for training units at the NTC is,
however, unique. The missions to be performed at the NTC
are drawn from Army doctrine [Refs. 15,16,17] and a complete
list is provided at Appendix A [Ref. 18:pp. 1-12,1-13].
These missions (of which some are indicated as critical and
will be performed by all units) are then assembled into a
tailored package of scenarios which can be varied in
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intensity to match the needs of the training battalion.
Thus, although scenarios and intensities are pre-written at
the NTC, by selecting from a "menu" of them a battalion
commander and his staff can tailor their training at the NIC
to directly meet their own unique needs.
The evaluation of units training at the NTC will be
accomplished by the integration of several methods.
Basically, they can be classed as monitering methods using
the assistance of the instrumented battlefield provided at
the NTC, and the traditional observer methods relying on the
judgement of observer/controller personnel accompanying the
unit. These two methods complement each other to a high
degree and interface with each other interactively. The
system serves to bridge the traditional shortfall between
training constraints and evaluation necessities and provides
data which can be utilized in the statistical evaluation of
tactical performance.
2. Subtaskina : The Top-Down Analysis
The top-down analysis technique was prescribed in
1979 as the methodology to be used in determining the
Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) , Measures of Performance
(MOP), and Essential Elements of Analysis (SEA) that would
comprise the NTC's evaluation program [Her 14:pg III-5 ].
1x3

The method, generally described, is:
"Top-Down Analysis. The technique is to assemble
.appropriate data sources to determine in the broadest
context the missions of each system (maneuver, indirect
fire, engineer). The system's missions are then
decomposed into progressively lower subdivisions until
quantitative measures can be applied directly." f Ref
T4:pg. III-5] L
This analysis, however, specifies no standards. The intent
of it is to produce a listing of quantitative measures which
can be used to conduct unit evaluations. This listing will
later form the basis for the actual evaluation of training
standards for large units.
"The major departure from the model used in ARTEP
development is that the MOE/MOP model identifies
measureable elements without imposing a standard. ... the
measures are quantitative not qualitative. The
qualitative assessment will be applied after the
development of quantitative measures." [Ref 14: pq. III-5]
The hierarchy for this procedure is shown at Figure 8.
The definitions for these items contained within the
pyramid are at Appendix B. The procedure here is the same
one as used by Scott, Meliza, and Banks to produce the
statistically reliable REALTRAIN results [Refs. 3,9,10,11].
The task of performing the top-down analysis of MOEs
for the NTC fell to the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Ft.
Leavenworth in 1979. Analysis began there under the
auspecies of the Combined Arms Training Development Activity
(CATRADA) , Unit Training Directorate (UTD) .
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/ MOE's \/ MOP'S \
/ Data \
Figure 8: The Top-Down Analysis Hierarchy
For a discussion of the analysis process which resulted in
these EEA, see Appendix C. These eight EEA accurately




With the identification of the eight EEA, the Unit
Training Directorate at CATRADA turned to the task of
selecting those MOE/HOP which would support the evaluation
of unit tactical performance under the EEA. Within the
THADOC community a MOE is defined as:
"A measure of effectiveness is a quantitative indicator of
force to accomplish its combat mission." [fief 19:pg. 25]
The ideal MOE should measure directly the degree toward
which a particular EEA contributes to the mission
accomplishment [fief 20;pg. 29]. As the MOE is a measure of
some quantity, it should be considered in light of the four
measurement scales. For a discussion of these four scales
see Appendix D.
CATSADA developed a unique methodology to assist
them in completing this portion of the subtasking analysis.
This methodology is described in detail in Appendix E.
The culmination of this process was a series of
EEAs, MOEs, and MOPs which for the first time accurately
reflected the heavy battalion combat process. This
subtasking analysis was then used to define the parameters
of the planned NTC instrumentation system. As CATRADA now
had a reasonably clear picture of the tasks to be undertaken
by battalions, the instrumented battlefield--designed to
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measure the accomplishment of these tasks—could now be
created.
3 . The Instrumented Battlefield
The data collection process at the NTC will be
extensive and complex. Data will be gathered from live-fire
as well as force-on-f orce engagement simulations. Inputs to
the data collection center will be made in several forms:
video recording of events; radio messages and data supplied
by field controllers; monitering and recording of radio
nets; and information received via the instrumented
environment. The basic instrumentation concept is
illustrated in Figure 9.
The Core Instrumentation Subsystem (CIS) is the
computer recording center. The CIS receives all data inputs
and serves as the operating area for the Exercise Management
and Control (EMC) teams and Training Analysis and Feedback
(TAF) teams. Antennas selectively located throughout the
maneuver area provide the necessary links between the field
instrumented exercise areas and the CIS. The live-fire
exercise area is also instrumented to record battle data.
NTC phase I instrumentation will consist of the
components shown in Figure 10. The CIS is the central
computer facility that provides all real-time data
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Figure 9: Pictorial Diagram of NTC Instrumentation System
processing and interactive displays necessary to moniter,
command, control and evaluate the training in all the NTC
exercise areas. The Range Data Measurement Subsystem (BDMS)
provides real-time position location and engagement event
data for all instrumented players. The fiange Monitoring and




















Figure 10: NTC Phase I Instrumentation System Architecture
sensors (field controllers) with communication links to the
CIS; this provides the means of monitering and controlling
all activities in the NTC training area. A Digital
Interface Component (DIC) provides the input/output link for
all digital data communications between the CIS and the RDMS
and RUCS. (A more thorough discussion of the component
functions is provided in Reference 18, pp. 1-14 to 1-21.)
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Each subsystem has its own capabilities and
functional requirements. Data gathered by the RDHS and SMCS
is transmitted to the DIC. The Die performs all electronic
signal and data transformations required to provide the
transmitted data to the CIS in useable form. The CIS then
processes and displays the data as necessary for analysis,
evaluation and decision making. Personnel in the CIS can
control the exercises by transmitting messages through the
DIC to the RMCS. An illustration of the data flow and
control links is given in Figure 11.
Initial instrumentation at NTC consists of equipment
already tested and in use by various Army experimentation
and testing agencies. This equipment includes the MILES
devices for casualty assessment and instrumentation to
record position location, event occurrences (such as firings
and radio transmissions) for 125 player items. Larger
weapons such as tanks and TOtfs will be fully instrumented
and also interact with MILES. Future expansion will
instrument 500 players, record events in more detail and
will also include activities at fire direction centers,
command posts and tactical air support control points as




































There are multiple capabilities contained in the
Phase I instrumentation package. Various devices will input
quantifiable data to the CIS. An example of this data
includes time of weapon firing (each weapon recorded
individually); whether a firing was a hit or miss; if a hit
is generated, the individual hit is identifed and the degree
of damage recorded; the positions of both players; and much
more. A disscussion of the actual quantities being measured
by the NTC instrumentation is provided at Appendix F.
The CIS software is programmed to tabulate and
compute such relevant information as: number of rounds fired
by each weapon system, weapon type, unit, etc.; number of
enemy kills, by each weapon and type; range of engagements;
and much other useful information. This data is then
manipulated into various formats to determine the statistics
used for unit evaluation: movement rate; weapons
proficiency based on the number of rounds fired to kill the
number of enemy targets; and so forth. A complete
delineation of all statistical compilations currently
planned for the NTC is provided at Appendix G.
The instrumentation has two other important
capabilities worth noting. In excess of 20 different radio
nets will be completely recorded during exercise periods
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which will provide a means of checking key events, and there
will be 6 video teams at various locations around the
battlefield to film the actual exercises. The entire
operating system is extremely complex and will undergo
improvement as experience is gained at the NTC. As with any
complex system, however, there are limitations to the
quantification capabilities of the NTC. These limitations
are discussed fully at Appendix H.
All data will be recorded in the CIS for evaluation,
and in such detail that each training elements operations
can be examined as a separate entity down to the individual
firing platforms. To assist in overall unit assessment tne
data can be compiled and aggregated to produce battalion
level statistics for whatever period is desired. The
display formats and data manipulation capabilities are
extremely flexible and allow a user to alter the format of
the desired statistics (For a more detailed discussion of
equipment capabilities and interface devices see Reference
18) .
B. THE CONCEPT OF STATISTICAL EVALUATION
In discarding the old ATP/ATT system the Army
effectively did away with unit "grading". This certainly
was a wise decision, for the grading system of the ATT was
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abused badly. Commanders often "stacked" the deck by
managing crews and elements to avoid testing poor performers
in order to obtain good grades. Other commanders unfairly
used the grade results to deal out "punishment" in one form
or another to poor performers. The ABTEP philosophy of
evaluation (and subsequent re-training and improvement)
without grading is sound and must be maintained. Any such
proposed methodology must avoid the appearance of a "report
card" or a comparison between specific units.
Yet clearly, there must be a form of differentiating
performance. "Mission accomplishment is too vague a
criteria, for certainly a unit which "takes the hill" with
85* casualties has accomplished its mission just as surely
as one which "takes the hill" with 20% casualties. The
Army, however, must discriminate between the trained and the
untrained; two such units obviously differ (all other
factors being equal) in their acquired combat skills. This
problem refers back to the major weakness of the ARTEP
itself: the lack of a quantifiable standard for evaluating
the tactical performance of large units. In order to
quantify such an evaluation, some sort of measureable
standard (not a grade) becomes necessary—be it percent
casualties, loss-exchange ratios, targets killed per rounds
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expended, or some other such measure of effectiveness. Any
program which serves to clarify these parameters will
ultimately help to refine the AHTEP itself into a more
useful document.
1 . Evaluation Without Grading
Fortunately, there exists such a methodology for
examining performance. In academic circles during the early
1960* s methods were devised to test students on their
intrinsic academic skills, without tying such an evaluation
to a series of grades. Most students are familiar with
these results; the Scholastic Aptitude Tests (SAT) , various
College Entrance Examination Board (CEEB) tests, the
Graduate Record Exam (GEE) , and in the public schools the
Iowa Test of Basic Skills (ITBS) , all utilize essentially
the same concept in evaluation, and it is a simple one.
Basically, the idea is that a students perf ormance--based
on the numerical outcome of a given test—can be compared to
a large, anonymous population (in effect, a normal
population), and using the method of z-scores, t-scores,
stanines, or any one of several statistical methodologies, a
percentile rating can be calculated for the individual's
performance in that skill area. Thus, instead of being told
he received a " B" in mathematics, a student is told he falls
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in the 80th percentile for his age group— a much more
meaningful assessment, for it tells the individual his
relative skill as it relates to his peer group. 5
This method has long been employed in the US
military to classify soldiers for service potential, which
is a situation where grading has little or no usefulness.
In a similar fashion it could be used to relate tactical
proficiency of a unit to its commander and staff without
resorting to any grades or unit comparisons. Certainly an
evaluation such as "you took the hill and suffered 20%
casualties; this performance falls in the 84th percentile of
all units who have accomplished this training objective" is
more informative to a commander than a brusque "you took
the hill and lost 20% of your force." One statement relaxes
a degree of accomplishment, while the other provides no hint
regarding whether or not 20% casualties was historically
excessive for this operation. 6
sit must be stressed here that this is an anonymous peer
group. No comparison of "Jimmy vs Johnny" is implied, or,
in fact, is even possible under this methodology.
^Indeed, the NTC development plan TRef. 14] requires the
determination of quantified (historical) standards for each
scenario, and states that:
"A secondary objective will be to define
baseline (norm based) standards (for scenarios)
by trend analysis of the data base." [Ref.
14:pg. 111-10]
This has not been accomplished as yet.
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Other benefits accrue automatically from such an
evaluation. Using a data base of these evaluations, it
would be possible to analyze them for inherent doctrinal
weaknesses; for example, if a particular operation yields
excessive casualties repeatedly, it may be determined that
this particular combat skill needs greater emphasis
throughout the Army, or that our doctrinal approach to the
problem is flawed. Further side effects of such an
evaluation system would be increased insight into the combat
process, and ultimately an enhanced ARTEP—one containing
more specific evaluation criteria which could ultimately
save lives in combat.
2« The Training Readine ss Profile
The Training Readiness Profile (TRP) about to be
proposed here would provide a vehicle whereby a unit
evaluation could be constructed in a non-competitive manner
without resorting to grades. Indeed, any other sort of
historical comparison is expressly forbidden:
"Unit evaluations will be for the sole purpose of
facilitating remedial training of the unit. There will be
no unit comparative scores or scoreboards. "[Ref. 13: pg. 2]
The TRP would be simple, small, easy to read, and hopefully
more informative to a battalion commander and his staff than
a series of bare statistics presented in a disjoint fashion
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at an after action review (AAH) . The TRP could begin with a
chart depicting overall mission accomplishment in a
percentile fashion calculated for each major combat mission
(Appendix A) conducted while training at the NTC. This item
would provide a basic overview of the unit's tactical
performance across the board. Following mission
accomplishment, pages depicting the unit's ability to shoot,
move, and communicate in each training mission would be
displayed. Finally, feedback from the observer/controller
evaluations could be portrayed followed by pertinent
comments from the SMC/TAF personnel, the Commander of the
NTC, and other individuals so tasked to provide a unit
evaluation. These comments would serve to counterbalance
and augment the machine generated statistics and introduce a
human (albeit more subjective) evaluation of unit
performance.
Such a document fills a need in the currently
planned system of evaluation and feedback at the NTC. The
after action review (AAR) methodology now planned for the
NTC is somewhat incomplete; although it is efficient in
reflecting what happened during a training exercise, and
provides some insight into why such things happened, it does
not convey degree of performance to the commander— how well
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he did is left for the commander to surmise on his own. 7 Any
allocation of training resources at the home station
following an NTC training cycle is then done based on his
perception of what was acceptable or unacceptable and any
linkage between certain levels of performance and his
overall unit mission accomplishment is left to the
commander's own insight. This is perhaps not the most
efficient use of the data generated at the NTC. In all
likelihood, a battalion commander and his staff will only go
through an NTC training cycle once together (planned
rotation cycle is every 18 months for each battalion at the
NTC) . In order to capitalize on the experience and improve
the conduct of home station training, some degree of
relative importance must be attached to training
deficiencies highlighted by the NTC exercise. The proposed
TRP does this in a concise and economical way, for a
commander whose unit performed in the 20th percentile for
communications procedures in the hasty attack and suffered
correspondingly high casualties while remaining in the 30th
percentile for other MOEs can draw a conclusion much more
7 In conversation with EMC/TAF personnel at the NTC,
there was no indication that the initial standards had yet
been generated for scenarios as required by the NTC
Development Plan [Ref. 14:pp. ill- 7 to 111-11]. This
perception could be erroneous, but even so, the TfiP would




accurately than a commander who is only given a numerical
summary of communication transmissions without knowing the
impact or whether the number of tranmissions was excessive.
Accordingly, the first commander who has availible for his
use a percentile standing knows his unit is below the mean
(average) in this area and can focus his efforts to remedy
this shortcoming. The second commander only knows he
suffered a large number of casualties and likewise knows the
number of radio transmissions made, but he does not have the
obvious link between the two facts since no indicator of
average performance is provided.
Thus, the TRP possesses several advantages (which
will be examined in detail later) . It reflects true unit
readiness, that is, it applies a relative standing within
the peer group to specific training performance. Using this
method, if one desired, true aggregated readiness statistics
could be generated for units within the Army that would
reflect a common assessment. The proposed format is
designed to be easy to understand and would not require
excessive statistical reports. Virtually all officers
should be readily familiar with normal score percentiles, as
all college entrance exam results are in this format. The
TRP would also be a true resource allocation tool—it would
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demonstrate the need for remedial training clearly and
provide an easy method for linking cause (training
deficiency) and effect (casualties) .
Finally, given a large enough population for
examination, the TRP could be used to set defacto standards
for the ARTEP. After the data base has become sufficiently
large to permit the assumption of normality, statistical
tools could be applied to such information to yield
quantifiable standards in unit training. This could improve
the ARTEP and yield an even greater benefit to the Army.
In this document the methodology used to establish
the current subrasJcs in use at the NTC will be examined, and
changes proposed to permit the generation of a TRP. The
theory behind constructing the TRP will be discussed and
followed with a sample TRP for examination. Lastly, a
discussion of the possible growth and implementation of this
system will be followed by a series of recommendations and
conclusions regarding the TRP system. In total then, this
document shall demonstrate an improved methodology for the




I II . THE MEASggEMENT OF TRAINING ACHIEVEM ENT
The key, as stated previously, to the uniqueness of the
National Training Center experience lies in the quality of
its evaluation process. First and foremost the NTC exists
to provide training to the heavy battalion task force.
However, in using the "Train-Evaluate-Train" cycle the
advantage of training at the NTC can be squandered if the
feedback process—the evaluation stage— is inadequate to
the task. In order to capitalize upon the first-rate
training opportunity provided, the most effective use musr
be made of the statistically reliable data being taken from
the instrumented training environment.
The purpose of the TRP is to provide an objective
normative evaluation of unit training performance. This
method is the best solution currently available to the
problem of evaluating training standards for large units.
The TRP will be generated for each exercise segment, which
is generally comprised of one mission (see Appendix A) . Any
evaluation to be conducted must be based on measures
concerning the activities that transpired during the
segment. since these measures are being compiled in order
to produce an objective evaluation, the measures themselves
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must be objective. The goal, therefore, is to develop a set
of objective measures that reflect overall training
performance. As defined by TRADOC, an HOE is a quantitative
indicator of the ability of a military force to accomplish
its combat mission [Ref. 19:pg. 25]. The issue now at hand
is to determine and define a set of MOEs that meet these
requirements.
Any set of MOEs that satisfy the above restrictions
could be used to produce an objective training evaluation.
There is no unique set that is optimal, but certain measures
are generally considered to be "better" than others in
providing a basis for assessment. The collective set of
MOEs should reflect overall unit effectiveness and not just
a series of disjoint "snap-shot" looks at specific areas of
performance (i.e., the set must cover the full spectrum of
performance to oe evaluated) . The MOEs should be defined in
such a way that different beginning force strengths and
capabilities are accounted for in the resulting number, i.e.
the measure should be "normalized". Percentages provide
this normalizing factor, but interpretation or comparison of
percentages can be misleading if the actual inputs to the
percentage computation are not available. In most instances
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a larger number is associated with being better so the
measures should be defined with this in mind.
The NTC collects an array of objective data from
training exercise activities. The collected data and
resulting statistics have formed the basis for developing a
set of MOEs that can be used to provide an objective
evaluation of the unit f s training performance. The
remainder of this section will present a set of MOEs that
provide a broad coverage of the unit activities. MOEs fit
into the current stucture of analysis categories at the NTC:
lission accompl ishmen t : shoot; move; and communicate .
Collectively, the MOEs yield an overall assessment of the
unit's performance. where percentages are used to normalize
portions of the data, the actual numbers used in the
computation will be given. In all cases, except where
specifically noted, a larger number represents a higher
level of performance.
A. MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT
A tactical mission is a tasking to perform a specific
function, i.e, attack, defend, etc. (see Appendix A). Other
instructions in the mission usually include such details as
when, where, or why the task is to be accomplished. There
is no single set of guidelines or standards that can be used
64

to judge whether or not an assigned mission was successfully
performed. In some cases this leads to a somewhat ambiguous
and subjective process in determining success or failure for
a mission. However, xhere are general areas of agreement
when assessing mission performance. These areas are as
follows: the friendly force must have enough survivors to
continue operations; the enemy force must be destroyed or
weakened to hamper further operations; and, if a time is
specified for an operation, it must be met. All of the
following proposed MOEs were developed so as to provide
flexibility in interpretation in these areas without
imposing a predetermined standard of acceptable performance.
Individually, the following MOEs provide an assessment of
unit performance in a limited view, but collectively they
represent the measures necessary to evaluate overall unit
performance.
1 • Percent OPFOR Vehicles Killed (POVKL
This is the percentage of OPFOR combat vehicles that
are killed by friendly weapons .
# of OPFOS combat vehicles killed
POVK = X 100
# of OPFOfi combat vehicles in
initial force
This is a direct measure of the mobility and firepower loss
suffered by the enemy. It addresses the effectiveness of
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the friendly force in directing fire at and/or destroying
enemy vehicles. Since a percentage is used here the measure
reflects loss relative to a particular starting strength.
2. Pe rcent,_ OP FOR_ Personnel Killed (POPK)
This is the percentage of OPFOH personnel that
become casualties.
# of OPFOR personnel killed
POPK = X 100
# of OPFOR personnel in initial force
This is a direct measure of friendly killing power
effectiveness and reflects the loss strength suffered by the
enemy. "(This) measure is used to evaluate total force
effectiveness when destruction of the opposing force is the
primary mission of both sides." [Ref. 21:pg. 4-43]
3 • Pe rcent OPFOR Loss Value,, (PQLV)
This is the percentage of the total value of the
OPFOR that is killed by the friendly force during the
exercise segment.
E(# of type "i" OPFOR targets killed)X (value of target type "i")
POLV = £ - X 100
value of initial OPFOR unit
The value of each OPFOR type is provided in the weighted
effectiveness index (WEI/WUV) table stored in the CIS (see
Figure 22, Appendix G) . This measure combines the
heterogeneous force structure of the OPFOR in a fashion that
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reflects the total fighting capability of the OPFOR that was
destroyed. The enemy usually does everything possible to
thwart the accomplishment of the friendly force mission.
This is a weighted measure which depicts the amount of enemy
combat power destroyed by the friendly force.
H . Percent Frien dly Vehicles Survived (PFVS)
The percentage of friendly combat vehicles that are
not killed by enemy fire.
# of friendly combat vehicles
surviving battle
PFVS = X 100
# of friendly combat vehicles
in inixial force
This MOE is widely used to provide a direct measure of the
survivability of the friendly force. It is an indicator of
how well the friendly force used available terrain to mask
movement and protect vehicle positions. A unit's mobility
is highly important in the battle area. This measure
reflects how well the friendly force was able to utilize its
mobility and conserve its combat power.
5. Percent Frien dly Personnel Survived ( PFPS)
This is the percentage of friendly personnel who
survive the battle.
# of friendly personnel alive
at end of battle
PFPS = X 100




This is an important measure which indicates whether or not
a force is capable of continuing operations. Successful
mission accomplishment is highly questionable if the
friendly force is reduced to a negligible strength during a
battle. This MOE reflects how well the friendly force
avoided enemy fire and is an indicator of the unit's ability
to properly execute sound tactical plans and conserve the
lives of its soldiers.
6 • Percent Frien dly Sur vival Value [PF S V]_
This is the percentage of the total value of the
friendly force that survived the enemy fire.
y (# of type "i" friendly forces alive)
Z-< X (value of friendly type "i")
PFSV = —— X 100
value of initial friendly force
The value of each friendly type is provided in the WEI/WOV
(see Figure 22, Appendix G) table stored in the CIS. This
MOE combines the heterogeneous structure of the friendly
force to reflect its survivability. Besides inflicting
enemy casualties and capturing objectives, the friendly
force must protect its personnel and equipment so they can
continue to fight. This weighted measure reflects how well
the unit conserved combat power.
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7 « Relative Loss Exchange Ratio (RLER)
This is the proportion of OPFOR losses divided by
the proportion of friendly losses.
( POLV )
RLER
100- ( PFSV )
The measure will be a pure number that compares the relative
value of the losses suffered by both sides. The relative
loss exchange ratio is a measure of friendly effectiveness
taking two major factors into consideration. The numerator
reflects the destructive capability of friendly weapons.
The denominator is a reflection of the ability of the
friendly force to survive. A combination of these factors
in a ratio approaches an overall indication of friendly
force combat effectiveness. [ Ref . 21:pg. 4-22]
8 • Time to Accom plish Mission (TAM),
This measures the total elapsed time from beginning
to completion of a mission.
TAM = (mission end time) - (mission begin time)
As a stand alone measure this MOE would not be very useful.
However, when a time is specified for a particular mission
this measure becomes vitally important. Even if a time is
not specifically stated this MOE can reveal deficiencies in
planning, movement and overall mission execution. For this
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measure, the stated mission will dictate whether a large or
small number is better. In an attack the friendly force
wants to capture an objective quickly before the enemy can
block the advance. For a delay or defense the friendly
force aims at holding back the enemy as much as possible so
a longer time is better.
B. SHOOT
The friendly forces must effectively and efficiently
employ their weapons to gain the maximum benefit of their
firepower. Direct and indirect fire must be organized and
placed in such a manner as to suppress the enemy
capabilities of fire and detection. Weapons must be used to
conceal and protect friendly movement as well as to destroy
the enemy force. To accomplish its mission, the friendly
force must "destroy enough of the enemy to convince him to
break off his attack, to give up a defensive area, or to
move from an area vital to friendly forces." [Ref. 16:pg.
ii]
"The tank with its cross-country mobility, its armor
protection, and its formidable firepower, has been and is
likely to remain the most important weapon in the
battalion task force. The accuracy of tank guns gives
them a high probability of a first round hit and the
lethality is such that if the target is hit it will be
killed." [Ref. 16:pg. 1-2]
The tank and other modern weapons require trained operators
to realize the full potential of this firepower. If aiming
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and firing are not done correctly large amounts of
ammunition will be expended with only a minimal number of
enemy casualties resulting. If gunners incorrectly identify
targets or use poor target selection procedures the friendly
force could sustain more casualties than necessary while the
enemy continues to fight. An important point to remember is
that enemy and friendly weapons possess similar capabilities
so a major contributor to mission success or failure will be
how well each side uses its firepower potential.
To assess the use of firepower potential the performance
of the weapons systems must be examined. Each weapon system
has its own individual impact on battle outcome. Along with
this impact is a synergistic effect gained from the mutual
support of other weapons. The selected MOEs for mission
accomplishment measure this combined force effect and
reflect the overall force effectiveness. This category of
MOEs is concerned with assessing the performance of selected
weapons systems: tank main gun, TOtf, and Dragon. The
performance of each system will be displayed separately in
the TRP, but will be measured using the same NOES.
Key areas in assessing weapon performance are the
accuracy and lethality of the weapon, its contribution
toward mission accomplishment, and the amount of ammunition
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expended by the system. The latter factor impacts heavily
on the required logistic support. Proper tactical
employment of all sytems must be considered, but note that
this overlaps with the categories of mission accomplishment
and movement. Shoot MOEs are defined to address these
issues as an input to performance assessment.
1 • Number of Rounds Fired (NRF^
The total number of rounds fired by all weapons of
this type.
NRF = Y^ (all rounds fired by this weapon type)
This measure reflects the fire capability of the particular
weapon system. It is also used to assess ammo conservation
and accuracy. This is not a stand alone measure and must be
considered along with the enemy casualties inflicted. This
number does, however, provide an indicator for logistical
requirements and when combined with the number of casualties
reflects weapons proficiency. A small number in this HOE is
good, provided the mission is successfully accomplished.
2 . Casualt ies Per Rou nd
_
(CPRj
A ratio of the number of enemy tank and antitank
weapons killed by this weapon type to the total number of
rounds fired by this weapon.
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# of enemy tank and antitank weapons killed
by this weapon type
CPR =
# of rounds fired by this weapon type
"This measure addresses kill productivity of a weapons
system directly." [Hef. 21:pg. 4-142] It considers both the
accuracy of a weapon and its lethality.
3. Percent Rounds H i t Target (PRHT)
The percentage of the total number of rounds firsd
that hit a tank or antitank weapon system.
total # of hits on a tank or antitank
weapon system by this weapon type
PRHT = * -- x 100
# of rounds fired by this weapon type
"This is a direct measure of accuracy of fire." [Hef.
21:pg. 4-159] There are some items that should be considered
when using this MOE for an assessment. When accuracy of
fire appears to be poor the range between the firer and the
target must be examined. A problem of attempting to use a
weapon past its maximum effective range is somewhat
different from missing targets that are within range. This
MOE does not distinguish between these two points. Also,
the NTC instrumentation currently uses hits and kills as two
distinct and mutually exclusive groups of weapon effect. To







The percentage of the total number of rounds fired
that were close enough to the target to impart a suppressive
effect (and be reflected by the MILES instrumentation) , but
did not actually hit the target.
# rounds counted as near miss against tank
and antitank weapons by this system
PRNM = X 100
# rounds fired at tank/antitank by
this weapon system
"Near misses are thought of as a suppressive effect. They
might also be thought of as a secondary guage of accuracy
of fire in the sense that a system with a high percentage
of near misses is more accurate than one with more
outright misses, when percent hits is egual." [Ref.
21:pg. 4-160]
This measure is not used alone, but should be used with the
other MOEs as an input to total firepower effectiveness.
5 . Weapons Fractional Kill Effectiveness (W F KE)
The percentage of the total enemy casualties that
was inflicted by this particular weapon system.
total value of enemy casualties inflicted
by this weapon type
WFKE = - i- X 100
total value of enemy casualties inflicted
The value of each enemy player is available in the WEI/WOV
table (Appendix G) stored in the CIS. This measure reflects
the relative effectiveness of the major weapon systems in
the force. It portrays how much each weapon system
contributed to the total casualties suffered by the enemy.
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«?hen combined with the other MOEs it allows for assessment
of tactical weapons employment and firepower effectiveness
of each weapon system.
C. MOVE
On a modern battlefield of highly lethal weapons the
friendly force must be proficient in maneuver in order to
survive. The enemy can detect movement that is not masked
by terrain or deception. A friendly force must conduct a
thorough map study and ground reconnaissance when possible
before selecting routes. The OPFOR is extremely mobile, and
is capable of moving quickly to block friendly advances or
to attack through gaps that might occur between friendly
forces.
To be successful, the friendly force must be capable of
moving quickly to engage a retreating enemy before he can
reorganize. If a gap exists, units must maneuver promptly
to prevent an enemy penetration. The keys to success
include using the terrain properly and the capability to
move forces quickly to decisive places in the battle area.
Measures in this area of performance should reflect the
ability of units to meet the above requirements. A leader
who uses sound tactical principles will select routes that
provide protection for his forces and allow sufficient
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maneuver area to use his mobility potential. A well trained
unit will generally move more rapidly than a poorly trained
unit because subordinate elements will require less direct
control and supervision. When vehicles are properly
maintained they operate longer before breaking down, thus
providing more mobility potential to the force.
The ability to move efficiently and effectively is of
vital importance. Fast movement rates do not necessarily
reflect better performance. A rapidly moving force might
sustain a high level of casualties because it is moving too
fast to use available terrain for protection. The point to
be made is that movement is an input to overall unit
performance, but must be considered in the light of other
factors (such as number of casualties) , to provide a measure
of unit effectiveness.
1 • Mean Rate o f Travel (MRT)




total elapsed time for travel
As the elapsed time increases, i.e. for an entire exercise
segment, this measure is very useful. This MOE will reflect
the travelling speed for the unit which averages the
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changing rates that occur throughout the time period. In an
attack mission this HOE is important since commanders need
to know how quickly their units can be expected to move to
an objective. For a defense mission this MOE is not
meaningful. However, in a delay this measure could be used
to account for the enemy mean rate of travel; in this case a
smaller number would be better than a large number. This
MOE is a direct measure of movement performance. "It is
considered superior to simple amount of advance which does
not take into account a possible increase in difficulty of
advance as distance from enemy decreases." [Ref. 21:pg.
4-15]
2 . Rate of Advance Toward Objective (RATO),
This is the rate at which a unit advances toward a
designated location (objective)
.
distance from start point to objective
RATO =
elapsed time to travel from start
point to objective
This measure addresses the timeliness aspect of
maneuverability. It is different from movement rate in that
the only distance considered in the computation is that
portion of movement that gets the force nearer the
objective. A long, circuitous route might allow for a
faster mean rate of travel than a more direct avenue of
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approach, bat there will be a longer total distance to move.
A direct route is shorter, but may allow only a slow rate of
travel. This measure combines both route selection and
speed into a single number. The distance from the start
point to the objective is fixed so the actual route
travelled does not change the numerator, but the travel time
from start to end will vary depending on the length of the
route and how rapidly a force can move along the selected
route. This MOE can be used to assess tactical movement
plans and the maneuver capability of the force.
Since each company size element is a separate
entity, usually with its own objective, this MOE will be
computed for each maneuver company. This measure is
meaningful for the friendly force when the mission includes
movement, such as attack. In this case a larger number is
better. When a friendly force has a mission to defend or
delay its movement rate will be less meaningful. In this
case the MOE should measure the enemy's rate of advance
toward the friendly position. Again, a separate measure for
each company would be appropriate. A smaller number
represents better performance in this case since the
friendly force is attempting to impede the enemy advance.
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3. Av era g e Perce nt Force in Contact (APFC)
This is the percent of the friendly force that is
engaged with the enemy, averaged over the duration of the
exercise.
£
# of friendly platoons engaged
each period
total # of friendly platoons
APFC = =~- X 100
total # of periods where engagement occurs
A platoon is considered engaged for an update period (every
five minutes) when a weapons pairing event occurs for at
least one member of the platoon. Regardless of the number
of pairings each platoon will be counted as engaged only
once during each period. A unit that goes through a series
of periods with no enemy contact will not necessarily
receive a lower number than a unit constantly engaged
because only the periods where an engagement occurs are
counted in the denominator.
This MOE provides a relative display of how well a
commander maneuvered and positioned his force in order to
direct maximum firepower at the enemy force. Where the
mission is to avoid decisive contact, such as delay, a
smaller number for this measure would be better provided the
friendly force delayed the enemy movement as directed by his
mission. This measure provides a key input for assessing
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overall deployment and maneuver of forces when coupled with
the MOEs for mission accomplishment.
** • Op erat ional R eadiness (OB)
This is the percentage of friendly combat vehicles
that successfully participated in the exercise without a
disabling maintenance failure. A disabling maintenance
failure shall be defined as any failure which renders the
vehicle reportable on the DA form 2406 (Materiel Readiness
or Deadline Report)
.
(# vehicles begin exercise) -
(# vehicles lost for maintenance)
OR =
# vehicles begin exercise
The "downtime" or time taken to repair the vehicle is not a
factor here, but rather only the occurrence of such a
failure in the vehicle. A unit must conduct routine and
proper maintenance on its equipment if the items are
expected to continue operating. Without vehicles a friendly
force loses effectiveness in mobility and firepower. When a
vehicle experiences maintenance failure it not only
decreases the unit combat potential, but also becomes a
burden for the logistics and support elements.
The number generated by this MOE is a direct
assessment of the unit*s vehicle maintenance capability.
Vehicles lost to enemy fire are nor considered to be a
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maintenance failure unless the failure occurred before
receiving enemy fire. No individual vehicle may be counted
more than once during a segment for this MOE. This is to
preclude negative OR values, which would be meaningless.
D. COMMUNICATE
The ability to communicate with other friendly elements
during a battle cannot be overemphasized. Effective command
and control are not possible if the leaders are unable to
communicate with their units. Commanders need the ability
to direct friendly maneuver and sometimes change designated
plans. To facilitate guick reaction a unit must receive
orders in a timely manner. When enemy contact occurs a
leader is aided by indirect fire weapons if he can call an
artillery or mortar unit. Coordination with adjacent and
supporting elements is necessary 10 insure efficient
employment of assets and to avoid interfering with other
friendly operations. Without effective communications a
battle could be total chaos.
As a point of assessment, well planned operations
usually provide contingencies for possible events, thus
reguiring fewer changes to orders. Units that are properly
trained can react to a developing situation without close
direction and supervision from seniors. A commander
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preplans fires to support his operation, thus requiring less
time to make a call for fire when needed. When units have
trained together and are more proficient in tactical
operations the amount of coordination effort is reduced.
Communication procedures emphasize that messenger or wire
linked telephone is better than the radio whenever possible
to preclude interception or jamming by the enemy. When
radios are used the operators should be trained to avoid
communication security (COMSEC) violations, i.e. excessive
transmission times, transmitting compromising information
about friendly forces, etc. Good commanders will use their
available time wisely for planning and will allow sufficient
time for subordinates to conduct their planning. The
dissemination of orders and combat intelligence is important
to insure that all friendly forces have the maximum amount
of information possible to help in planning and/or executing
assigned missions. These areas should be considered when
assessing a unit's communication capability.
All MOEs in this category have been defined so that a
smaller number represents better performance. Each MOE is
aimed at providing an assessment of the unit performance for
the considerations discussed above. The collective set of
MOEs will reflect the unit's overall communication
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capability. Any specific MOE with a high number in this
area could be an indicator for identifying training
deficiencies.
1 • Avera ge Trans mission D uration (ATP)
The average duration of a radio transmission made by
the friendly force.
total summed duration of all friendly
radio transmissions
ATD =
# of friendly radio transmissions
This measure provides an indicator of how long each radio
transmission lasted. For well trained units all
communications should be brief, with the unit relying
instead on standard operating procedures (SOPs). Lengthy
information should be sent by some means other than radio.
The longer a radio set remains keyed, the greater the chance
that the enemy will intercept the signal. Communications of
short duration serve to deny the enemy information about the
friendly force and increase the chance of survival.
2. Average Numbe r o f Transmissions (ANT J.
This is the average number of radio transmissions
per time period made by the friendly force during the
exercise.
# of friendly radio transmissions
ANT =
elapsed time of the exercise (mm or hr)
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As discussed above, a unit should attempt to minimize its
use of the radio. An excessive number of transmissions
allows the enemy to track friendly movement based on emitted
radio signals. The more often a radio is used the more
chances the enemy has for exactly locating the unit. Tha
opportunity to commit COMSEC violations increases. A large
number for this MOE reflects extensive supervision or
direction between elements which should not be necessary for
well trained units. Dividing by the elapsed time of the
exercise serves to "normalize" the number for comparison
with exercises of different duration.
3 . Percent of Transmissions Possibl e RDF (R D F)
The percentage of friendly radio transmissions that
exceeded 25 seconds, but were less than 55 seconds in
duration.
# of transmissions >25 seconds and <55 seconds
RDF =
# of friendly radio transmissions
A radio transmission period of 25 to 55 seconds is
sufficient time for the enemy to "radio direction find"
(RDF) a unit location [Ref. 22: pg. 57]. This means that the
enemy can establish a close approximation for the friendly
unit location if a radio transmits for that duration. If a
unit continually transmits for this lengthy duration it will
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be located and the most likely result is that enemy fire
will be directed on the position. To increase the unit
survivability and deny the enemy information about friendly
locations this number should be low.
(I. Number of Sig nificant Transmissions (NST)
The total number of radio transmissions of duration
greater than or equal to 55 seconds.
NST # of radio transmissions > 55 seconds
The enemy has the ability to pinpoint a friendly location if
a radio transmission from that location lasts 55 seconds or
more [ Ref . 22:pg. 57]. To provide maximum protection for
the unit the number of transmissions in this category should
be minimized.
5 « Percent Plann ing Time Forwarded
,
(PPTF)
The "percentage of total planning time available
that an echelon allows to all lower echelons." Here, the
percent amount of time that the battalion task force allows
to its companies.
time Co ordered to start execution -
time TF order issued
PPTF = X 100
time Co ordered to start execution -
time mission received by TF
This measure accounts for the timeliness of the command
function. It considers planning time, decision time, time
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to prepare an order and then disseminate it to subordinate
elements. "The measure addresses effectiveness of command
and control by assessing how quickly planning is completed
on an order issued in relation to the time available." [Ref.
21: pg. 4-120] This MOE not only addresses the effectiveness
of the command functions, but also assesses the
communication procedure in the coordination phase of the
planning and in the actual dissemination of the order, k
rule of thumb states that each echelon should allow 50% of
the available time for its subordinate units in the order
preparation activities. This measure does not assess the
quality of the planning or the order that was issued. [Ref.
21:pg. 4-120] The input information for this MOE must be
obtained manually by the observer/controllers (OC^s)
.
6 . Me an Dissem ination Time (MDTi.
The time required to disseminate an order,
directive, or warning to all elements at the next lower
echelon of command.
(time Bn TF order acknowledged by last Co) -
(time order was approved)
MDT =
# of orders issued
If companies are to conduct proper planning and preparation
for operations they need information on a timely basis.
Units that are well trained usually have SOPs for preparing
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and distributing orders to subordinate elements. These
methods decrease dissemination time, increase the
reliability of message receipt and usually avoid radio
transmission since the duration would be lengthy. This
measure assesses the effectiveness of the communication link
that ties the companies to the battalion headquarters. A
smaller number is better for this MOE [Hef. 21:pg. 4-122].
The input information for this MOE must again be obtained
from the OC. It may also be possible to obtain this
information from the monitored battalion command net, if






Army training evaluations have never before provided
statistically reliable data (see Chapter 1, section C) . One
of the major weaknesses of the ABTEP system has been the
lack of consistent, reliable evaluations. This has promoted
the vicious cycle of sister battalions evaluating each other
in training, and therefore causing all such evaluations to
sink to the "lowest common denominator". One unit cannot
evaluate another beyond its own skill level. The NTC
provides the Army with the first real opportunity to
establish a consistent Army-wide training evaluation that
reflects true unit performance. This opportunity will be
lost if no standards, normative or absolute, are applied in
the evaluation. At this point in time it is very difficult
to generate absolute, fixed numbers to be used as standards
for the various MOEs defined previously. 8 Without such fixed
standards there is no current method available to convey the
existence of a standard or level of performance to a unit.
A normative evaluation, however, provides a means for
solving this problem.
8 Indeed, due to the synergistic effects of combat, it
may be impossible to set numerical standards for some of the
flOEs generated in xhe top-down analysis.
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The purpose of the THP is to provide an objective
training evaluation to the heavy battalion task force
commander in order to best facilitate remedial training in
the most efficient manner. In the previous discussion of
the POT cycle it was pointed out that the key to training
was the establishment and evaluation of training standards.
The TRP system is designed to accomplish the evaluation of
training standards for large units. It does this without
setting an arbitrary guantitative standard by utilizing a
normative (relative performance) based evaluation. This
goal is consistent with the ARTEP philosophy of training,
the purpose of the NTC, and the NTC development plan as
written by HQ, TRADOC. [ Ref s. 6,13,14]
The TRP is based upon guantified measures specifically
designed (as previously shown) to eliminate human bias and
error in evaluation. Its use will make substantial progress
in eliminating subjectivity in performance evaluation. The
format, it is felt, is concise, brief, and easy to
understand. It employs as a methodology the simple concept
of normal scores which is readily familiar to the Army
Officer Corps. All data is presented in a format which has
many intrinsic benefits, is simple to calculate using
existing equipment, and utilizes an off-the-shelf
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methodology which has been proven to be reliable as an
indicator of performance.
In order to effectively implement the TBP concept some
minor changes will be required in the statistical methods of
the NTC. Such changes involve only small recalculations of
new statistics utilizing the numbers currently provided by
the NTC data gathering structure. Some additional OC inputs
are necessary, but these are not burdensome and indeed,
border on the trivial. No new instrumented measurements are
required for the TRP. The methodology has been created to
function within the existing NTC operational framework.
Yet for the effort of recalculating some statistics,
certain very tangible benefits will be realized . The TRP
will provide the following enhancements to the NTC
evaluation structure:
Se^J;£ r eflect ion of mission accomplishment — The TRP
utilizes several accep^e3""Irmy""H5Bs""["R"eT.""2l ] that will
give a clearer picture of actual unit mission
accomplishment. The commonly accepted technique of
"normalizing" data [Ref. 19: pp. 39-40 J permits a moreintrospective assessment of overall unit performance.
l~l£.er understanding of relative performance (without
comparison) — Using the T"5P"7 a commancTer anH""his staff can
gain a truer picture of their organization's relative
level of training. The use of a percentile evaluation
indicates a degree of relative performance which can
easily be used to "key" an item for intensive follow-up
training. This system also automatically assists the
commander in prioritizing his efforts. Yet, for all these
benefits to be gained, no unit comparison or "scoreboard"
is necessary; indeed, the methodology almost entirely
precludes grading and stays within the ARTEP philosophy.
Allows for gr eat er flexibility in applying sta n dar ds
—
AltEough" theTT?! EeveTopmenT Plan [Ref. T4: pg. IlTr7 to
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Ill- 11] requires unit performance to be compared to a set
of standards, the TRP methodology mandates no fixed
standards. Since the commander is doctrinally responsible
for fixing standards [ Ref . 5: pg.13], the TRP evaluates
units based on relative competence only and allows the
commander to fix standards at whatever level desired. The
TEP also readily lends itself to the calculation of
standards when it is deemed approDriate to do so.
Better illustrat ion of complementary weaknesse s {cause an<




on areas of performance, i.e. it can better demonst
~>f relatively low performance
giDie wnen presented in the rorm of
bare numbers and statistics. The format of percentile
evaluation allows for greater depth of analysis.
The TRP is a major aid to identifying training
weaknesses. It will highlight deficiencies much more
efficiently, it is felt, than simple numerical summaries of
training events. It will facilitate the commander's own
appraisal of his unit*s performance and help to focus his
subsequent training efforts. This action, in turn, helps to
conserve valuable resources and achieve the desired
goal— the most efficient, effective training possible under
the train-evaluate-train concept, both at the NTC and the
unit home station.
A. THE DECILE EVALUATION
An efficient set of measures of effectiveness have been
defined that reflect combat training proficiency. It
remains to be shown how best to present to the commander the
information contained in these measures. A unit can conduct
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meaningful remedial training only after it clearly
understands where all training deficiencies lie.
At first consideration it would seem that the raw score 9
obtained from the MOE would present all needed information.
Indeed, if this MOE really represents a quantitative
evaluation of unit performance, can the raw number be
improved upon? Certainly, because the raw score only
reflects things as they happened at that moment in time when
the unit conducted its operation. Other synergistic effects
on the instrumented battlefield could have influenced these
raw scores on any other given day. This is to say that
there is some inherent inaccuracy in every evaluation, no
matter how carefully crafted.
"In the more general sense, the notion of the equality of
raw score units clearly violates one f s sense of an.
underlying scale since the raw score scale separations are
only the result of the interaction of the particular items
that have been put in the test and therefore have no
generality." [Ref. 23:pg. 511]
Thus, in order to convey real generality (and hence true
performance) these raw scores must be operated on and
displayed in the context of relative (normative)
performance, which tends to account for within-exercise
variations. Some methodology must demonstrate what the raw
9 "Score" as used here refers only to the numbers
obtained from the MOEs themselves and is consistent with
current evaluation literature. It does not imply a




scors of each 302 aeans when related to the population of
heavy battalions in the Aray that have trained at the HTC.
In this aanner a truer unit evaluation can be obtained— one
which reflects relative training accoapiishaert, both Aray-
wide and between aeasured areas, or MOEs.
1 . 5asic Assuapticn s
Essentially, the procedure being suggested for the
TRP is that aggregated total s of unit perforaance statistics
will provide a defacto set of standards against which
another unit can be coapared. This is not aeant to iaply
"unit coaparison", but rather that aggregated statistics
over the long haul will provide an adequate set of standards
or precisely, noras. This is, in fact, the procedure as
envisioned for the NTC by HQ, THADOC:
continuing process until criterion casec coaoat stancaras
for the NTC scenarios are developed. This chase will be
continuous. Initial standards will be developed by Aug
30." [Sef. 14:?g. 111-10]
There are several assuaptions iapiicit within this aethod.
a. Normative Perforaance
The first and key assuaption aade is that unit
perforaance, on the whole, will reflect an adeguate level of
aission accoaplishaent. Certainly, in the abscence of
nuaericai standards, it lakes no sense to coapare a unit
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against a set of norms if the normative performance (as
reflected in the data base) is inadequate. If, in the data
base, aost units are failing to accomplish a particular
mission, it would be useless to compare another unit against
this aggregate. Such a data base only provides the norm for
failure.
Therefore, the assumption is made that most
units training at the NTC will accomplish their mission.
This assumption would seem to be borne out by the fact that
historically, in training, units rarely fail utterly in
accomplishing their mission. Naturally, degrees of mission
accomplishment exist. It is, however, believed that this
topic will not prove to be a serious problem in practice.
The second assumption regarding normative
oerformance is that aggregated unit performance will provide
an acceptable normative standard. As an example, it is
assumed that heavy battalion task forces training at the NTC
will not regularly be annihilated in the hasty attack, or
any other mission. Certainly if training battalions
regularly suffer 85^ casualties in order to accomplish a
given mission, this would provide an unacceptable, although
adequate, standard (i.e. the mission is being accomplished,
but at too high a cost). This situation is more likely to
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occur than the former. If this assumption proves to be
false it can be corrected by "fine tuning" exercises and
scenario redesign. On the real battlefield commanders will
not regularly assign impossible missions to units which
require virtual unit destruction in order to achieve mission
success. Therefore, it is assumed that units will be able
to accomplish most assigned missions (if properly executed)
without sustaining excessive casualties,
b. NTC Procedures
In calculating portions of the TfiP it is assumed
that standard scenarios of roughly equal difficulty are
being employed. Currently, it is planned to draw from a
series of pre-packaged scenarios, constructed by mission
(see Appendix A) , the particular situation to serve as the
basis for issuing exercise segment operations orders
(OPORD) . These scenarios have been developed based on the
guidance of the NTC commander [Ref. 24] and are designed to
be of relatively equal difficulty for each mission. 10
Several versions of each scenario exist. These versions are
designed to play the same scenario (mission) over different
terrain. The assumption of equal difficulty is inherently
toBased on discussions in September of 1981 with MAJ Jim
Ireland, UTD-NTC CATRADA, the action officer responsible for
developing the scenario package.
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tough to validate. However, it is not deemed likely to be a
problem, as common military judgement seems capable of
producing scenarios of equal difficulty.
It is also assumed that the TRP calculations
will be restricted to scenarios of like intensity. Unit
commanders may choose the exercise intensity level they
desire for their units. These intensity levels are
determined by fixed quantitative inputs expressed in terms
of OPFOR combat assets. Thus, for example, a hasty attack
scenario at intensity level 3 requires certain actions and
the presence of certain specific OPFOR assets. As this
intensity level is quantifiable, it is assumed that TRP
calculations will be restricted to like intensity levels and
thereby the TRP calculations will be drawing samples from a
homogeneous population.
Lastly, it is assumed that data which is
contaminated by machine failure in any significant way will
not be incorporated into the TRP statistics.
2 . The Use of T-scores
A quick perusal of the MOEs selected for the TRP
makes one fact obvious. Although each MOE produces a
quantitative number, all are on incommensurate scales or
consist of different measured items. Each MOE can, in fact,
96

be considered to be a random variable possessing its own
unique distribution. The problem of comparing these items
in order to determine training weaknesses (and subsequently
allocating training resources for remedial training) becomes
a little like sorting apples, oranges and bananas for "the
best color". Each item (HOE) has its own intrinsic scale of
measurement. Almost every MOE collects data on a ratio
scale, i.e. a scale that possesses a fixed zero point for
calibration (see Appendix D) , but each scale is somewhat
different in terms of measurement units.
Therefore, in order to evaluate relative performance
across varying MOEs, some method of transforming this
quantitative data becomes necessary. Educational
measurement literature describes several scaling methods.
Each has its own usefulness, but in particular, the T-score
scale is selected here for use with the NTC data.
The main reason for choosing a scaling method lies
in the principle that:
"In no case does a single measurement give us a great deal
of information. A single measurement selected from a
known distribution tells us much more, for then we can say
whether the item picked is exceptionally large or small.
In fact, we can say what proportion of cases fall above or
below it." [Ref. 25:pg. 325]
Each MOE can, of course, be considered to be a random
variable. Thus, one of the easiest methods for conducting
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an analysis of relative performance would be to construct a
frequency distribution for each HOE, and then compare the
measured unit data point to this distribution to obtain a
straight percentile evaluation. This is an acceptable
procedure and is simple to perform. However, there are
disadvantages to this method, and chief among them is:
"The percentile rank scale is clearly ordinal and,
according to most points of view, its units are unequal
since they are intended to provide equal proportions of a
group, not equal intervals on a scale of ability." [Ref.
23:pg. 5 15] 2 L
One of the intrinsic goals of the TRP is to reflect the
performance of a unit across various MOEs on a scale of
ability, that is, to help the commander determine which
areas most need further attention. Therefore, arranging MOEs
on a scale of "equal ability" becomes important.
Additionally, if we do not know the distribution of each
HOE, it should be considered that:
"Many times it is difficult to look at an entire
distribution, and we should like some way of designating a
single score (measurement) so that its value tells at a
glance whether it is a comparatively large or small
value." [Ref. 25:pg. 325]
Therefore if we wish to use the TRP as a resource and
training allocation tool we should obtain evaluations
reflecting equal intervals on a scale of ability. The
measures of relative performance should be drawn from a
known, recognizable distribution with a predetermined mean
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and standard deviation for ease of HOE comparison. The T-
score method of scaling provides these characteristics.
Finally, once the NTC is in full operation it may be
discovered that the instrumented data requires "smoothing".
That is, battlefield synergism may cause data to be obtained
in a non-continuous manner. A histogram of such data for a
particular MOE may reveal "bunches" or gaps in the
distribution. This problem can be overcome by employing T-
scores. The T-score method can eliminate such synergistic
effects or day-to-day variation by "smoothing" the data. 11
The T-score is a normalizing method. Regardless of
the MOE distribution, T-scores are reflected against a
normal probability distribution. In this sense it is
"distribution free". The T-score method is described as
follows [Ref. 25:pg. 325-326]. A baseline data set is
defined against which the current evaluated unit is to be
related. Given the numerical value (say M) for an HOE, the
number is compared to the baseline data set for that MOE.
The proportion "p" of cases falling below this value is
determined. This "p" value is then used with a cumulative
normal distribution table to obtain a "z" value. The "z"
1 i This advantage to using T-scores does carry with it an
underlying assumption that the data being "smoothed" is, in
fact, drawn from a normal distribution.
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value corresponds to the point on the normal curve abscissa
where the area under the curve to the left of "z" equals "p"
percent of the total area under the curve. Now, any
variable "T" can be "standardized" by a linear
transformation to a designated scale (This is the common
method of Z-scores, [ Ref . 25:pp. 31-32]). The scale used by
the T-score (arbitrarily chosen here) has a mean equal to 50
and a standard deviation equal to 10. This choice will
facilitate later comparison efforts and provides the "equal
interval of ability" in the form of the standard deviation,
which equals 10. The standardized value, (T-50) /10, is then
set equal to the "z" value obtained above. The resulting
equation
,
z ' (T-50) /10
is solved for T which is the desired T-score. [Ref. 25:pg.
325-326]
As an example, if H is such that 90X of the baseline case
measures fall below it, then p=. 90. Consulting a
cumulative normal distribution table yields a 2-1.28 for
this corresponding p value. This leads to the equation:
1.28 = (T-50)/10. Solving the equation produces T = 62.8.
This score, then, relates unit performance on this
single MOE to the baseline data for that MOE. It provides a
"normalized" measure that reflects actual unit performance.
This measure will facilitate later statistical operations on
the data, but for the moment it provides a representation of
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relative unit performance on an equal interval scale of
ability.
"It was pointed out earlier that since the properties of
the raw score scale, or a linear transformation of the raw
score scale, are dependent on the characteristics
{difficulties and intercorrelations) of the particular
items that happen to have been chosen for the test, it is
frequently considered to be advantageous to transform the
scale to some other system of units that would be
independent of the characteristics of the particular test
and, in the sense of a particular operational definition,
equally spaced." [Ref. 23:pg. 515]
Therefore, the T-score is used.
3 • The Baseline Dat a
For comparative purposes it is important that the
baseline data used as a norm be properly defined. The
baseline data essentially establishes the norms against
which a training unit will be examined in order to reflect a
relative performance evaluation. As such, the items forming
this standard reference group must be similar in most
important respects to the group being evaluated [Ref. 23: pg.
513].
Once the NTC is operating at full capacity it is
planned to rotate 42 battalions per year through the
training programs there. Each battalion in the continental
OS will actually rotate to the NTC for training once every
18 months. Therefore, a total of approximately 63 battalions
will be trained at the NTC every 18 months. Because a
normative evaluation is planned for the TRP, this population
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of 63 previously trained battalions would represent the most
current set of "norms'* availible to a training unit. In
effect, a "moving baseline" is suggested here as the most
meaningful normative population.
As a battalion begins training at the NTC, a new
baseline data set is calculated. The oldest battalion data
set would be dropped from the baseline, while the most
current (the 63rd trained battalion, or the last previous
battalion data set) would be added. Thus, as the first TEP
is calculated for the battalion in training, all MOE data
for it would be compared against the previous (most current)
63 battalion data sets on file.
This "moving baseline data" would have several
advantages. First, it would preclude inter-battalion
comparison and eliminate any possibility of "grading"
between battalions in training. Each battalion would be
compared against a new set of norms. Thus, relating one TEP
to another would render no meaningful comparison. The
comparative evaluation provided to the training battalion,
however, would still be meaningful as it would relate
current unit performance to the most recent performance of
unit peers. This would still allow brigade or higher
commanders to establish training priorities by using several
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TRPs r for although no unit comparison is possible, certainly
trends can be identified.
Secondly, such a "moving baseline data" set would
allow for gradual training improvement over time. Certainly,
as OC's and TAF personnel become more proficient the
training value of NTC exercises will increase and likewise
unit proficiency will increase. By sequentially dropping
and adding data to the baseline, normative "standards" will
rise gradually as the salutary effect of NTC training begins
to improve Army-wide training readiness. Thus, training
units will not suddenly find the norms drastically different
from cycle to cycle. Units may then train in confidence
knowing their performance will be related to the
accomplishments of peer battalions since their last visit.
No particular data analysis would therefore be required in
order to maintain the data base—the baseline would, in
effect, become self-maintaining.
As with any system, however, there are certain
problems inherent to the moving baseline data set. Changes
in TO&E (organization) or equipment (the substitution of M1
tanks for MU8A5 tanks, etc.) are, in effect, changes in the
population. Data collected from such units will not be
compatible with the data base as originally established and
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will incorrectly influence the norms. Thus, new units must
be treated separately and new baseline data sets established
for them.
At the current time in Phase I of the NTC, it is
planned to only instrument armor-heavy battalion task force
teams in training at the NTC. Thus, a homogeneous
population for the baseline is initially insured. When
mechanized infantry task forces are fully instrumented at a
later date, their data may prove to be incommensurate with
armor-heavy TF data. Since both battalions use the same
types of equipment (and differ only in the quantity
authorized) the "normalizing" effect of the MOEs chosen for
the TRP (see chapter 3) may eliminate this problem.
However, this fact must be analyzed and verified before data
from both types of units can be comingled in the baseline
data set.
These questions can be settled by examining NTC
instrumented data as it becomes available. The "moving
baseline data" set concept is sound, and can undoubtedly be
implemented once these initial questions are resolved.
4 • Th e Cal culati on of Decile Standing
It is instantly recognizable, however, that a T-
score is unacceptable for psychological reasons as an
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indicator of unit relative performance. The simple use of
the word "scores" is enough to conjure up ghostly visions of
the old ATT and ORTT graded systems which the Army has
eliminated. Any evaluation method such as is proposed here
must scrupulously avoid the appearance, however slight, of a
graded result. It must be remembered that the calculated T-
score is NOT a "score" or "grade", but rather a convenient
method of reflecting and standardizing a number to represent
relative performance. Therefore, although the T-score is
statistically a very useful result (and can provide a wealth
of data to an operations research analyst) the final
evaluation must be presented to the unit commander in a
different format.
One solution to this problem is the use of decile
evaluations. The T-score is a normalized statistic and thus
reflects a position on the normal curve. If the area under
the normal curve was subdivided into ten equal proportions
of area, it would form deciles (see Figure 12). This form
of partitioning is very similar to the stanines 12 method
used by the Army Air Force in WWII for personnel evaluation.
12 "Stanines" was a general standard score system
developed by USAAF psychologists for use in WWII. The plan
divided the normal Dopulation into nine groups, or "standard
nines". The result was a distribution with a mean = 5.0 and
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Pigure 12: Deciles
Once this decile subdivision has been accomplished,
the T-score for each 30E can be placed on the curve into its
appropriate decile. This decile evaluation of relative
performance can then be provided to a unit commander without
any appearance of a score and its associated stigma.
Thus, when several MOEs are displayed in bar graph
style side-by-side* comparisons of relative performance in
each of the areas becomes easy and almost immediately
obvious. An SOE where a unit performs high in a relative
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comparison will be represented in one of the upper deciles
while an area of relatively low performance will be shown by
a bar in the lower deciles.
This system is, of course, somewhat circular. This
same information could be conveyed to the unit commander by
utilizing the straight percentage calculation initially
discussed. However, if the problems of "unsmooth" data
occur, or if the data turns out to be sparse, 13 then the T-
score method will allow for meaningful statistical analysis
of unit performance whereas the percentile evaluation will
not. Additional benefits also accrue from the use of IE-
scores and deciles in the field of statistical analysis (see
Chapter 5 for discussion)
.
Thus, the decile evaluation, coupled with the use of
T-scores provides a meaningful, normative evaluation which
facilitates analysis to identify areas of training
deficiencies. In turn, this helps in resource allocation
and highlights the direction of remedial training. A
further benefit of this normalized system is that it relates
relative performance between the various measured MOEs to
the commander.
t3 That is, if many units achieve identical numerical
totals for the various MOE. In this situation, the data




This is, indeed, a necessary endeavor, for as the
educational community dicovered decades ago:
"An individual's test score acquires meaning when it can
be compared with the scores of well-identified groups of
people. Manuals for tests provide tables of norms to make
it easy to compare individuals and groups. Several
systems for deriving more meaningful "standard scores"
from raw scores have been widely adopted. All of them
reveal the relative status of individuals within a group."
[Ref. 26:pg. 1]
Given the great value of the statistically reliable
information delivered by the NTC, the Army can do no less.
To do otherwise is to discard hard-won, expensive data
which, if properly and completely analyzed, could ultimately
save lives in combat.
B. THE TRAINING READINESS PROFILE STRUCTURE
The quantitative measures used to provide an objective
unit evaluation and the underlying theory for showing
relative performance have been given. The next step in this
process is to explain how these measures of performance can
be displayed for a unit commander. It is important that any
presentation be concise yet thorough; that is, address the
main issues of training performance and avoid minute
details. Numbers that reflect actual as well as relative
performance will assist the commander in identifying areas
for future training. Any representation should be easy to
understand and interpret so it can serve as an aid to the
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commander and his staff even after returning to their home
station. The remainder of this section will outline a
structure for displaying the TRP. For ease in understanding
the structure a sample TRP is presented.
1 . Organization of the TRP
The TRP will consist of four separate pages. The
first page will display the unit performance with respect to
overall mission accomplishment. The other pages will
reflect the unit performance in its ability to shoot, move,
and communicate. No direct correlation exists between the
four separate pages. However, specific MOEs that portray
low performance on one page may be further explained or
supported by MOEs on a different page. An example of this
relationship is provided in the sample TRP.
Each page is constructed and presented in the same
manner. The zop of the page is titled to provide the
exercise segment conducted by the unit (attack, defend,
etc.). Under this title is the functional area covered by
the page: mission accomplishment, shoot, move, or
communicate. Following this, there is a bar chart that
shows the various HOEs for that functional area along the
abscissa. Listed with each MOE are the actual numbers used
to compute the value of that MOE. The decile incremenrs are
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displayed on the ordinate axis. Above each MOE is a bar
that shows the performance of this unit relative to the
units considered in the data base. The "shoot" page has
three bars for each MOE; each bar depicts a different weapon
type.
Interpreting the results shown on the bar graphs
will lead to the identification of training weaknesses. In
all cases, a bar that fits in the lower decile areas
indicates that relative to baseline performance, this unit
has a training weakness. Some MOEs are defined so that a
small number is better (e.g. all MOE in the communicate
area) . The TRP is constructed to accomodate this fact.
Units with higher numbers will be placed in the lower
deciles. The key to understanding these graphs is in
realizing that any bar above the 5th decile means this unit
performed better than average, relative to the baseline
data. Likewise, any bar in the lower deciles reflects the
fact that this area needs further training, relative to
Army-wide norms.
This system allows the commander, at a glance, to
identify areas of performance that contain training
weaknesses. The commander can then concentrate his efforts
and conduct a more thorough analysis of this area. Using
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the detailed data collected by the NTC instrumentation a
more specific listing of soldier and unit tasks can be
identified for remedial training.
2. Sa mple TRP
The following pages depict the TRP that could be
generated for a typical tank heavy battalion task force
training at the NTC. Numbers shown on the sample TRP are
ficticious and are not intended to represent any particular
unit. The analysis accompanying each page of the TRP is
taken from the displayed results and represents a possible
interpretation. The general context of the comments
concerning unit performance are available from proper
interpretation of the TRP. Some specific items in the
comments would reguire more justification. In the case of a
real unit being evaluated at the NTC the actual numbers to
support these comments would be readily accessible through
recorded radio nets, video tapes of activities, or from
svents recorded by the instrumentation.
Before discussing each TRP page it would be helpful
to obtain a clear understanding of what is depicted. The
numbers shown below each MOE reflect actual unit
performance. As an example, in the area of mission
accomplishment (see Figure 15), the friendly force killed 18
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of the 30 OPFOR combat vehicles and 239 of the 425 OPFOR
personnel that started the exercise segment. The length of
the bar above each MOE represents how well this unit
performed relative to the units considered in the data base.
Since a data base is currently nonexistent the displayed
results were determined by assuming a hypothetical data
base. Examples of the calculation for relative performance
are:
Killing 18 of 30 OPFOR vehicles (or 60*) places this unit
so that 56* of the units in the data base killed a lower
percentage. Therefore, p=.56 and from the normal curve
table z=.15. This produces a T-score of 51.5 and
reference to Figure 15 shows this score to be in the 6th
decile as depicted on the TRP.
Killing 239 of the 425 OPFOR personnel (or 56X) places
this unit so that 62* of the units in the data base killed
a lower percentage. Therefore r p=.62 and from the normal
curve table z=.305. This produces a T-score of 53.05 and
iws
decile as depicted on the TRP.
reference to Figure 15 show this score to be in the 7th
A sample TRP follows and is given with a possible
interpretation for the various category pages.
a. Mission Accomplishment (Figure 13)
This unit performed well in killing the OPFOR,
both vehicles and personnel. This high level of performance
in both areas combined to produce an even higher overall
OPFOR loss value than expected. From the MOE #8 it seems
the unit moved very quickly through the exercise segment.
Relative to other units this unit lost a high percentage of
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Figure 13: Sample Mission Accomplishment THP Page
*4, loss of vehicles. Even though the friendly force
sustained a large percentage of casualties, MOE *7, the
relative loss exchange ratio, was not uncomfortably low
since the friendly force was able to inflict heavy losses on
the OPFOR. Possible reasons for the areas of relatively low
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performance might include (and can be supported with OC
comments)
:
The unit was moving too fast to allow vehicles to use
proper movement techniques.
The vehicle drivers and commanders were not trained well
enough on the use of terrain for cover and concealment to
mask movement.
Since the unit moved so fast there was insufficient time
to place forces in overwatch positions to provide
protecting fires.
These reasons are not all inclusive of the possibilities and
may be incorrect. The other TRP pages need to be examined
to determine if any of these possibilities have merit.
b. Shoot (Figure 14)
The tanks and TOHs fired fewer rounds than
normally observed for this type of action while the Dragons
seemed to fire more. With respect to weapons proficiency,
it appears that the tank gunners did not kill or hit many
OPFOR targets (MOE #5) relative to the norm. However, the
percentage of near misses was relatively high, which means
the tank gunners had identified the targets, but were not
shooting accurately. Input from the field controllers
indicated that since the unit was moving so quickly most
tanks were firing on the move. This unit might need
additional gunner training to shoot while moving. In the
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Figure 14: Sample Shoot TRP Page
OPFOR vehicles during the exercise. This may seem good, but
relative to other units the tanks usually accounted for
approximately 70% of the OPFOR vehicles killed. »OE #5
(weapons fractional kill effectiveness) indicates that the
Dragons killed many more enemy vehicles than usual while
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both the tanks and TOWs were low killers in relative terms.
By referring to the battalion operations order and position
locations of various players, it was determined that the
commander led his movement with the infantry, thereby
allowing Dragon gunners many more shots at the OPFOR. This
resulted, however, in the friendly force losing several of
their own vehicles since friendly tanks were behind the
infantry and not in a position to return fire on the OPFOR.
The player position plots revealed that TOWs were not
employed from available overwatch positions. Rather, they
were used with the leading maneuver element and thus their
capabilities were limited.
c. Move (Figure 15)
From the mission accomplishment page it is known
that the unit finished the exercise segment guickiy. This
is confirmed by the depicted movement rates. Comparing rhe
two rates, it can be seen that the unit followed a fairly
direct route. They only travelled 20 kilometers, and there
was 16 kilometers straight line distance from Company A's
start point to its designated objective. A map sxudy
revealed a different route that was slightly longer but
could have provided more rolling terrain for concealment.
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Figure 15: Sample Move TfiP Page
and protected each others flanks. Relative to other units a
good portion of the friendly force remained in contact with
the OPFOR. This pressure might have been the cause of the
enemy withdrawing in a fashion that left his vehicles
exposed to friendly fire. Operational readiness was
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relatively low and a check with observer/controllers
indicated that 4 of the 6 vehicles lost for maintenance were
lost because of improperly maintained oil levels,
d. Communicate (Figure 16)
Relative to other units, the number and duration
of radio transmissions was good. All areas of communication
seem to be fine with the exception of radio transmission
length, or HOE #4 (transmissions greater than 55 seconds)
.
Each company contributed to this count of 5 messages. By
referring to recorded radio nets, it was determined that
these lengthy transmissions were caused by company
headguarters sending the operations order to their platoons.
The OPFOR controllers indicated the OPFOR was able to
identify some friendly locations and surmised that increased
radio traffic indicated an operation about to begin. The
OPFOR reacted guickly and was able to position more forces
to the front of the known friendly locations. They did not
have ample time to construct prepared positions, however,
due to the fast movement of the friendly force. This caused
the OPFOR vehicles to leave their fighting positions sooner
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Figure 16: Sample Commo THP Page
The foregoing example TEP and its accompanying
analysis is intended to demonstrate how the THP could be
utilized to assist the battalion commander in reaping the
maximum training benefit from the HTC. The THP is envisioned
as being incorporated in the after action review and is not
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intended to replace the formal AAB. The TEP should be
presented and explained in detail at the AAR to insure that
unit commanders can best utilize the document for home
station training. The intended primary recipient of the TEP
is the battalion commander and his subordinates, as these
training managers are directly responsible for troops—and
the accomplishment of the real mission: the application of
combat power against the enemy in war.
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7 « OTILIZ ATION_AND_ EXPANSION ..QF..T HE „TRP
k key point stressed throughout this paper is that the
NTC exists for the purpose of training heavy battalion task
forces. In the train-evaluate-train cycle, the evaluation
must be accurately directed at training weaknesses. The
unit can then use this evaluation to guide its future
training and resource allocation. It has already been
demonstrated how the TRP helps to identify the areas of
training deficiency. The issues of concern now focus on the
question of how will the TRP aid the commander as training
levels improve over time or as new areas of performance are
considered in the evaluation process. Acceptable levels of
performance can be established and checks should be made to
insure the unit evaluation is being based on meaningful
measures of effectiveness. Techniques for expanding and
using the TRP to address these issues will be covered.
Although it has not been emphasized so far, the NTC has
a secondary mission to:
"Gather mrormation to help improve doctrine, tacti<
training system, equipment, and procedures. This
information also assists the Army in relating resou;
readiness." [Ref. 13:pg. 1]
It is proposed to use a trend analysis of the NTC data for
assessing current Army efforts. The TRP presents an ideal
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structure for summarizing relative unit performance trends.
This allows for easy comparison of performance for different
years or any desired time frame. A brief discussion of the
TRP usefulness in this area will be provided.
A. ESTABLISHING COMBAT PERFORMANCE STANDARDS
Despite the inherent advantages and usefulness of the
normative evaluation, this type of evaluation has one major
deficiency: it does not follow the pattern mandated for
Army training in the performance oriented training (POT)
system
.
The POT system requires that an elements actions be
compared against a fixed standard, and that training will
continue until the standard is achieved. It has previously
been pointed out that although this process is fairly easy
to follow for the individual soldier, it becomes
increasingly difficult to do as the element grows larger in
size (see Figure 4). In fact, one reason given in support
of the TRP was that such objective standards may be
impossible to set for the synergistic action of battalion
level combat. It would be difficult to say that a battalion
which siezed the objective, captured 85* of an enemy force,
and killed 10% had failed to accomplish their mission.
However, this could be the absurd judgement made if the
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"minimum enemy casualty" standard for this particular
exercise was, say r 30%. The point here is that there may be
an infinite set of combinations of standards which would
lead to victory. There is reason to believe, however, that
a few fixed standards, if applied with common sense, can be
developed to reflect minimum acceptable performance (MAP)
levels. The TRP can be singularly useful in doing this as
it begins with a finite set of "combinations of standards"
in the baseline data.
1 • Deter mining S tandards
The problem of determining standards for performance
at the NTC has already been considered by Headquarters, US
Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) . Indeed, a
model has been proposed for this process (see Figure 17) .
The initial analysis of this model has been completed, and
only the qualitative application— the actual setting of
standards—regains to be done. The next and last phase
planned is: "Ef forts. .. will be to integrate the initial
analysis with the realities of actual operations." [ Ref
.
14:pg. 111-10]. A great deal of work has gone into the top-
down analysis for subtasJcing the combat process (see Chapter









u> Move under fire


























Figure 17: NTC Standards Development Plan
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is the integration of reality and analysis. It is in this
area that the TRP can provide real assistance.
There are basically three methods which can be used
to set "fixed" numerical standards. The first method
consists of the normative approach already proposed. Using
the TRP, the baseline data set can provide an average value
for every MOE used in the evaluation. If all units are
accomplishing their assigned missions, and subjective 1 *
analysis reveals that pertinent indicator MOE values are
within the desired range (casualties, percent enemy killed,
rounds expended, etc.), then pure MOE average values can be
used as a standard. Basically, this amounts to a validation
of both the normative TRP system and the current Army
organization, doctrine, and training.
If, on the other hand, the average values of MOEs
prove to be unacceptable, then a second system can be
employed. A subjective search of the baseline data could be
undertaken to find those units whose performance in all or
most of the MOEs was above a fixed decile level, say, the
7th decile as an example. An average of the MOE values
l *These judgements must by nature be subjective, and the
perogative of the Army's senior (general) officers. If the
NTC process is accepted as being representative of real
combat, then such decisions as what constitutes "acceptable"




recorded for these units could be taken and these numbers
employed as a standard for the various MOEs. This method
rests upon the theory that well-trained units perform most
operations well, and any unit which is evaluated at or above
the 7th decile in most MOEs could be considered w<?ll-
trainad. Units with high morale, esprit, and cohesion
generally perform at a high level most of the time. The
performance of a less well-trained unit would tend to be
more sporadic by MOE.
A third method for assessing standards from the TRP
would be a combination of the previous two. For some MOEs
the straight baseline average value might be acceptable and
for others, the "search out the best units" technique could
apply.
Certainly, in employing any of these techniques, the
subjective assessment of senior Army officers must also be
injected. As an example, the NTC Commander might feel that
units are failing to aggressively conduct operations and are
overall suffering an unacceptably high level of casualties.
The standards for casualties sustained could be arbitrarily
raised to establish a training goal for units to achieve.
This is well within the perogative, and indeed is the
responsibility, of the NTC Commander or other more senior
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commanders. In fact, the TRP system possesses such
flexibility that it would be possible for large unit
commanders (perhaps division) to set their own unit
standards for training. This standard could also be
reflected on the TRP to provide one additional piece of
information for training assessment to the training
battalions. A method for displaying these standards will be
provided in the following section.
It should be apparent from the above discussion that
standards for unit performance can and should be
established. Whatever methodology is employed, the TRP
structure and concept provide a useful asset in determining
the numbers. Once standards are set, they can be revised as
deemed necessary.
2 • The Presentation of Standards on the TRP
It has already been demonstrated how the TRP will
assist a commander in identifying training weaknesses. This
is a tremendous asset to the commander when he develops the
unit training calendar and allocates vital resources. The
benefit of the TRP relative performance indicator has been
discussed. It provides the commander with an objective
assessment depicting which areas of his unit need the mos*
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training as well as his unit performance relative to other
units who trained at the NTC.
There is another important piece of information that
can be displayed on the TRP. Once the minimum acceptable
performance (HAP) levels have been established, as outlined
in the previous section, they should be reflected on the
TRP. A commander is certainly concerned about the relative
performance of his unit for various training areas, but it
is not sufficient to perform at an upper decile level if the
minimum standard has not been achieved. Likewise, a unit
may be assessed at a lew decile level of performance, but if
the minimum standard was still accomplished the commander
can concentrate training efforts in areas where the MAP was
not achieved. This will serve as an additional aid to the
commander in prioritizing his allocation of limited
resources for training.
Portraying this standard can be accomplished with
minimal effort. It can be reflected in a manner to make TRP
interpretation easier and more meaningful. As all MOEs are
defined separately, an independant MAP should be established
for each MOS. Given a number that represents the MAP for a
specified MOE, it will be compared against the current data
base to find the percentage of units that did not perform at
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or above this level. This percentage becomes the "p-value"
used to convert the MAP number to a T-score. A horizontal
dash will be drawn in the MOE column at the decile rating
associated with the calculated T-score.
To provide a better understanding of the MAP
concept, the communicate TBP page from the sample in chapter
3 has been reproduced below. Hypothetical standards have
been established and are depicted on the TBP. A calculation
to determine the MAP plotting level has been shown.
Finally, interpretive comments have been provided to
demonstrate how this additional item of information, the
MAP, can aid a commander in his training evaluation
assessment
.
For this type unit in a movement to contact mission, the
current standard is to attain an average dissemination
time of 10 minutes. According to the data base 19* of the
units failed to achieve this standard. Therfore, p=.19
and from the Normal curve table z=-.878. This produces a
T-score of 41.22 and reference to Figure 15 shows this
score to be in the second decile as depicted on the TRP
(see Figure 18)
.
Additional interpretations of the TEP page could be as
follows (see Figure 18):
Even though the unit did relatively well in MOE #1
(average transmission duration) the MAP was not achieved.
One other area which fell below the MAP was MOE *4 (number
of transmissions exceeding 55 seconds duration) . If the
































Figure 18: Sample Communicate TRP Page »ith aAPs
to shorten lessages the radio transmission length will
decrease in both areas. This should be priority one for
communication training. 15 The unit performed relatively well
i5 The commander must still assess a training resource
tradeoff between major areas, weapons proficiency and
communications for example. This decision should be aided
by the mission accomplishment TRP page and the overall
exercise avaluation orovided by the TAP.
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Min HOE #2 and #3. It should be noted, however, that the MAP
as barely achieved and this training area should receive
second priority. In the other categories being evaluated
the unit not only performed relatively well, but also
exceeded the MAP. These areas do not require additional
draining resources. 16
3 • Revising St andards
The establishment of MAPs and the benefit they
provide has already been discussed. To serve this useful
purpose, however, requires that qualitative standards
development be a continuing process. Revisions to the MAPs
are necessary for two reasons: the Army force structure or
operating procedure may change, and hopefully, units will
become trained tc a higher level of proficiency.
Army combat developments activities are constantly
analyzing weapons systems, tactics, doctrine, etc. as used
by our forces, to determine if they can be improved. When
improvements to combat effectiveness are possible the
procurement of a new weapon system or an appropriate change
to tactical employment may be initiated. The improved
l6 Althogh not depicted on this TRP page there might be
an occassion when a unit performance is relatively low, but
still achieves the MAP. Areas where the MAP was not
achieved should receive further training emphasis before an




effectiveness usually means a better performance capaoility
of the friendly force.* 7 By natural extension of reasoning,
this should mean that the standard for unit performance
should be raised.
The purpose of the NTC is to provide a location
where heavy battalion task forces can conduct realistic
training. As units train at the NTC they will be provided
with an assessment that outlines their training weaknesses.
If commanders use this asset to develop training plans they
will certainly allocate resources to the areas that reguire
the most improvement to attain the MAP. This will hopefully
produce units that are more combat proficient in these areas
(see Figure 7) . As the level of training improves the
standard for unit performance may be raised.
B. CHANGING THE BASIS OP EVALUATION— SELECTION OF NEW MOES
An assessment of unit performance is based on the areas
that are observed and/or measured. The assessment is only
meaningful when it remains within the limits of the areas
observed and the measurements taken. A unit evaluation
compiled from the TRP is derived from the analytical base of
17 Cost and operational effectiveness analyses conducted
by the Army are a prime example of this. Before a new
system is developed it must oe determined that the
additional effectiveness provided to the force by the system
is worth the cost reguired.
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the TRP, that is, the defined MOEs. The complete unit
assessment is supported by other collected data, but the
MOEs provide the main direction for an evaluation.
Therefore, any meaningful assessment of unit performance
should be limited to the areas addressed by the selected
MOEs.
When the MOEs were presented in Chapter 3 it was notad
that there was no unique set of measures to use for an
evaluation. The current TBP graphs have been outlined for
the purpose of assessing unit performance in the areas of
mission accomplishment, shoot, move, and communicate. If
specific functions in these areas are to be asessed then the
MOEs can be redefined to measure selected items of
performance in greater detail, i.e., through more detailed
subtask analysis. As the data collection capability of the
NTC expands, the span of evaluated functional areas can be
increased. Under the present TRP structure the subjective
input of the controllers is not directly incorporated into
the unit assessment, but this can be done. Each of the




1 • Evaluating Current MOE s
The MOEs defined for use with the TRP should be
viewed as an initial starting base. They were selected
because collectively they provide a measure of overall unit
tactical performance. These MOEs should assist in
establishing meaningful standards for acceptable levels of
performance.
As the level of training improves across the Army,
more and mora units will achieve the MAP level for certain
MOEs. A "significance analysis" of those MOEs should be
conducted on a routine basis to determine when all or most
units are regularly attaining the desired standard. When
most units have attained the MAP level for an MOE, the MOE
tends to lose importance or significance in the evaluation
process, i.e. it does not provide an indicator of training
deficiencies. If this situation occurs, the MOE should be
considered for elimination from the TRP. This change can be
accomplished from cycle to cycle without regard for unit
scheduling, as there is no comparative value to the TRP.
Changing MOEs from one battalion to the next is immaterial
to the TRP concept as the TRP is not intended to be used for
inter-battalion comparison, but rather as an asset for
identifying training weaknesses. If the units have achieved
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the MAP level then their training resources should be
directed to a different area.
As some MOEs lose importance and are dropped from
the TRP r it would become possible to incorporate new
measures without the size of the TEP becoming unwieldy.
Additional MOEs might focus on providing a more in-depth
measure of particular performance areas. If desired, the
detailed top-down analysis of unit tasks conducted for the
NTC could be used to provide candidates for new TRP MOEs.
Any MOE proposed as an expansion to the TEP should be
checked for the following criteria:
It must possess an operational definition that can be
measured.
It must provide a measure for a relevant area of unit
performance.
The information gained from it should not already be
provided by some other MOE.
Provided these conditions are satisfied, the MOE could be
added to the TRP structure on an appropriate page.
The volume of data collected at the NTC will grow
quickly as the number of training units increases. Once a
data base has been established an analyst can conduct a
correlation analysis on the various MOEs. In some cases,
two or more MOEs may vary in a related fashion, i. e. under
a given set of conditions they change in a proportional
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manner. When these relationships are found, the extent of
the correlation can be determined. If the degree of
correlation proves to be significant, then some of the MOEs
may be dropped from the TEP without losing valuable
information. This is possible because the remaining MOEs
can be used to estimate the performance in the area of the
eliminated MOE.
The method of correlation analysis goes beyond
comparing selected MOEs. In the sample TRP several
assessments were made that required substantiation from
sources other than the TRP. The process of relating these
other data items to the TRP is referred to as correlation. 18
In the following section it is explained how subjective
controller inputs and other measureable areas can be
structured into measurements for MOEs. This will assist in
the process of correlating all available data to produce a
more thorough evaluation of unit performance.
2 • Sc aling PC Inputs
At the present time the OC inputs determined at the
NTC are of little statistical value (although of great value
18 When the correlation involves subjective measures of
only an ordinal or nominal scale, nonparametric tests of
correlation are available. See Siegex [ Ref . 27] for a
complete discussion of the Spearman and Kendall correlation
coefficients used for this purpose.
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for subjective evaluations) . Certainly the OC plays a large
role in the actual operation of the NTC, for their
evaluations provide not only the standardized "professional
evaluator" feedback, but also provide the only observations
of battalion command group operations. This in itself makes
them indispensible, for the actions of the battalion command
group can often determine victory or failure regardless of
troop training levels.
The battalion command group observation plan for the
NTC is well thought out and calls for the subjective
evaluation of thirty different flOEs by the OC £Ref. 28].
These MOEs cover the full range of battalion command group
operations. It is planned to record the OC observations
from this plan in the CIS data base for cataloging and use
during AARs. Edited lists of these comments are to be
provided to training battalions in the take home package
(THP) .
Two further evaluations are also planned for the
battalion command group and staff. The first is the
Battalion Command Group/Staff Evaluation form [Ref. 29:Incl
1,pg. 26]. This evaluation incorporates MOEs from the
original plan [Ref. 28], but requires each OC to rank the
battalion command group performance on a scale from one to
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ten. The purpose in doing so is mainly geared toward
assisting the NTC in assessing trends in battalion training
and OC standardization. As the concept paper states:
"There is no intention to use these values as part of the
feedback to the training unit. Analysis of these ratings
should not be used to compare one unit against another, or
for the purpose of assigning a level of performance to the
battalion." [Ref. 28]
These ratings were designed to extract the following
information:
"a. OC reliability by comparison of the assigned ratings
and the objective measures from the instrumentation.
b. Correlation of a selected MOE or MOP to overall
effectiveness.
c. Training trends across all visiting battalions. Once
a trend is identified then a detailed testing plan can
be developed for more detailed study.
d. Measure the effectiveness of NTC command and control
training of unit by graphing the ratings over time."
[Ref. 28]
However, there is a great deal more information contained in
this evaluation if it can be gleaned from the raw data. One
of the key components of the statistically significant
evaluation is the presence of trained evaluators capable of
rendering a standardized judgement. The NTC Command Group
Evaluation Plan [Ref. 28] is reluctant to ascribe
reliability to these numerical ratings, as indeed they are
categorical judgements made by human beings (not machines)
and hence, subject to a variance in accuracy.
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However, there is inherent value in the judgements
of human beings. Although one of the major weaknesses of
the ARTEP is its reliance on human subjective evaluation,
this does not mean there is no worth to such judgements.
Some hold the opinion that the lack of standardization in
training and scenario leads to inaccuracy in AfiTEP
evaluations more than the internal variance of human
judgements does. If we assume that a judges "feelings"
about the scale value of an instance (here the scale is 1 to
10) is a normally distributed random variable, then it
possesses some mean and variance. This fact can be
exploited to follow a technique for constructing an interval
scale using data obtained from categorical judgements.
Fortunately, such a technique exists. In an
unpublished paper entitled, On Constructing Interval Scales
Using Data Resulting From Categorical Judgem ents , (Naval
Postgraduate School, 1981) [Ref. 30], Professeor Glenn F.
Lindsay outlines in detail a method by which categorical
judgements exactly like the OC 1 to 10 scale can be
connected to an interval scale (see Appendix D) . This
method can be used for any number of judges, and is suitable
for machine computation. The method as described [Ref.
30:pp. 1-15] literally constructs estimates of the mean and
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variance of the particular "feelings" (ratings) of judges
and ultimately, through the assumption that these feelings
are normally distributed, produces an estimate of the MOEs
value on an interval scale. The method also produces
estimates of the upper and lower bounds for each category,
i.e. the categories 1 to 10.
The end result of this method is a particular value
for this given MOE (drawn from the Battalion Command
Group/Staff Evaluation form, Figure 19) arrayed on an
interval scale which shows the relative interval width of
each category (1 to 10). These category widths are
different for each MOE as each MOE is evaluated as a
separate entity. In applying this concept to MOEs evaluated
by OCs at the NTC, the value given as a final ranking for a
particular battalion must be transformed in some manner to
be used on the TRP.
What is obtained as an end result of applying
Lindsay's method is, for each MOE on the Battalion Command
Group/Staff Evaluation form, a value for each battalion in
the baseline data located on an interval scale of varying
category width. This information provides all that is
necessary for the TRP. As the battalions in the baseline
data set have been ranked, in effect, on this interval scale
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Use the scale shown below to rate the overall
performance of the Command Group and Staff as a unit
on each item. Determine the quality of performance
based on your observations and use the scale that
best fits your assessment. Specific examples to
support the ratings should be recorded on the
evaluation plan. These comments will provide input
for after action reviews and preparation of the
"Take Home Package".
MARGINAL ADEQUATE EXCELLENT123 4567 89 10
Low High Low High Low High
1. Develop plan based on mission.
1.1 Analyze missions.
1.2 Identify critical combat information and
intelligence.
1.3 Analyze friendly capabilities.
1.4 Select routes/zones to objective.
1.5 Select battle positions.
1.6 Plan and coordinate fire support.
1.7 Plan for terrain modification and
breaching operations.
2. Prepare and organize the battlefield.
2. 1 Determine critical place and select a
course of action.
2.2 Select control measures.
2.3 Communicate/coordinate plans and orders.
2.4 Prepare logistical estimates and plans.
2.5 Prepare personnel estimates and plans.
3. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield.
3. 1 Gather critical combat information and
intelligence.
3.2 Analyze OPFOfi.
3. 3 Disseminate critical information and
intelligence.
—j
Figure 19: 3attalion Command Group/Staff Evaluation Form
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for this HOE r the proportion of rankings above and below the
value assigned to the current training battalion can be
calculated. This provides the p-value necessary to
calculate a T-score, and results in a decile evaluation for
the TRP.
The current Battalion Command Group/Staff Evaluation
form contains eight MOEs with each MOE possessing from two
to seven MOPs. This scaling procedure could be applied to
each MOP individually, and if desired an entire TRP could be
generated to reflect the OC evaluations. This same
procedure applies without modification to the Process
Assessment form [ Ref . 29:Incl 2], the second evaluation
planned for the battalion command group/staff. This was
designed by the Army Organizational Effectiveness Center and
School (OECS) to evaluate the within-group (Command
Group/Staff) process of coping with missions and external
stimuli [Ref. 28]. Obviously, if this wealth of information
is not desired the OC input could be scaled down by
calculating TRP values for only selected MOEs and including
them in the previously outlined TRP.
This method must, cf course, be used carefully, as
it is much more subjective by nature than the machine
gathered data. The basic assumptions of the Lindsay method
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need to be studied in conjunction with real OC input data to
determine questions of the reliability of OC input, and
whether the method is truly appropriate. These questions
cannot be examined until real OOobtained data is available.
The method is offered here as a suggestion for expansion
along a path that could prove to be very profitable for the
Army. It is net inconceivable that most battalion
performance may be highly correlated to battalion command
group processes. Thus, investigation with the TRP could
yield the real key to determining how best to train
battalions in a cost effective manner. It may be possible
to determine the empirical relationship between command
group performance and unit proficiency. If this occurs,
real cost effectiveness in training could be achieved, as it
is certainly cheaper to train a group of several officers
than a unit of several hundred soldiers.
3 • Expa nsion of
.
Evaluation. Capability
Certainly the most fruitful areas of expansion for
the TRP lie in the direction of those EEAs identified as
important in the top-down anlysis, but not yet incorporated
into the NTC instrumented environment. The combat service
support (CSS) , nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC)
,
command, control, and communication (C 3 ) and intelligence/
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counter intelligence EEAs are important on the battlefield.
Any increased reporting procedures which can help to
properly evaluate these functions will ultimately improve
the overall evaluation of a unit. These functional areas
need to be further analyzed so that the processes involved
in these areas can be identified. Once the processes are
enumerated, quantifiable MOEs can be defined for the basis
of an evaluation.
The first area, CSS f is most amenable to further
instrumentation and should be equipped at the earliest
possible time. If CSS vehicles could be instrumented to
reflect even just position, a wealth of CSS data could be
obtained. Instrumenting fuel tanker vehicles to reflect
flow rates, and supply vehicles to indicate type of load,
i.e. ammunition, food, etc., could greatly improve CSS
measurement. These improvements would allow the
determination of MOEs directly related to CSS evaluation and
thus this topic could be included in the TRP.
NBC evaluation will, for rhe forseeable future, be
relatively uninstrumentable. OC input could be used to
assess NBC casualties if real gas (non-lethal training
agents) were employed against training units. Such casualty
assessments could be reflected in the mission accomplishment
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portion of the TRP as an adjunct to percent friendly
personnel survived (PFPS) and plotted on the TSP adjacent to
PFPS in a fashion similar to the multiple weapons MOEs.
This crude assessment would be flawed, however, since many
casualties would undoubtedly escape controller detection,
but would at least provide a rough determination of NBC
defensive capability.
C 3 and intelligence/counter intelligence remain as
two areas difficult to evaluate. Little can be done at the
moment to instrument such evaluations since these are
primarily "people" assessments. The OC may already possess
an effective tool for evaluating these areas. The Battalion
Command Group/Staff Evaluation form contains some C3 and
intelligence considerations. These could be expanded by
defining additional MOEs [Ref. 29]. Osing the technique
outlined in section 2 above, it could be possible to
assemble TRP pages containing evaluations for these areas.
This subjective evaluation is at the mercy of the
limitations pointed out previously, but at least it offers a
"rough cut" at determining a true evaluation of their
contribution to unit performance. Thus, C 3 and intelligence
MOEs could be reflected as appropriate on the TRP.
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These suggested expansions of the NTC capability are
by no means complete. Competent analysis of NTC operations
after the instrumented battlefield is fully operational will
no doubt reveal other methods for evaluation. These
suggestions offer a beginning, however, based on the T3P
methodology. The rapid and complete dissemination of
evaluation results to the training unit can only increase
training proficiency and aid the commander in allocating
limited training resources.
C. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
The NTC exists to train the heavy battalion task forces,
and entertains other functions only when they do not
interfere with unit training. This is absolutely correct as
a policy. However, the wealth of data gathered at the NTC
cannot be allowed to lie fallow. The establishing authority
recognizes this fact, and states that:
"A trend analysis of data will be useful in assessing
current doctrine and tactics and evaluating training
development efforts. .. Testing of new concepts, equipment,
or systems will be permitted at the NTC when it does not
interfere with the training or the training environment."
[fief. 13:pg. 2]
A great deal can be accomplished with the NTC data in
its present format, but even more can be done with the
instrumented data if it is drawn from the TRP structure.
There is much that can be learned about the combat process
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in this manner. Only a few simple statistical analysis
techniques are needed to begin reaping rewards from this
available data. A basic approach is suggested here. This
is by no means an all-inclusive listing of available
statistical procedures, and should be viewed as merely a
starting point for analysis purposes. Certainly the shape
and form of real NTC data, once it is obtained, will
determine the appropriate statistical inference techniques.
1 • The X Statist ic
One of the most useful statistics in probability
theory is X, tfie average of a data sample. If we regard the
MOE as a random variable, then at any given moment the
baseline data set contains 63 historical sample poin-cs for a
given MOE. The Central Limit Theorem [Ref. 31:pp. 255-260]
then allows one to use X as an estimate of the population
mean, n , as long as we are sampling from a normal
population. This presents a minor difficulty, as the
assumption that the MOE distributions are normal has not
been made explicixly so far. This situation will require
the judgement of a competent analyst. Before performing any
operations on T, the data set must be transformed to normal
(if not already normal) . Having done this, a number of
operations can be performed with X.
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Since X is the mean of a random sample of size n=63,
drawn from a normal population with mean = n and variance = <rz
its (X's) sampling distribution is also normal with mean = /i
and variance o"2/n. It can be demonstrated that for the
normal population, X is the maximum likelihood estimator of
the population mean. Thus X yields some concrete
information about the parameters of the baseline data set
population. This population is, of course, the set of heavy
battalions in the continental OS training at the NTC.
Hence, X reflects the attributes of the Army as a whole.
This fact can be useful for trend analysis. The NTC
will certainly have a salutary effect on training levels
throughout the Army. A time plot of X, using the baseline
data set, should reveal Army-wide progress trends for each
MOE. This information would be particularly useful in
assessing the effectiveness of NTC training over time and in
future justification of the NTC operation (budget) . To
ascertain more accurately the actual significance of these X
values, confidence intervals about X can be calculated for
given levels of significance using standard statistical
practices. [Ref. 31: pp. 342-346]
The calculation of a confidence interval about X
might also yield other useful information, as it would
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reflect the "spread" of the X statistic considered to be
significant. An appraisal of the width of that confidence
interval night give some subjective idea about how precise a
reflection of training particular MOEs are. If the
confidence interval is large, it may be due to a fundamental
difficulty in the MOE; that is, the MOE may not be an
accurate reflection of the guantity being measured.
Hypothesis testing of X could also be conducted to
assist in trend anaysis. Osing one-tailed tests, it would
be possible to determine the direction of change in the mean
from period to period (guarter to guarter, month to month,
or whatever report interval is desired) . That is, given a
period 1 preceeding a later period 2, a null hypothesis that
the mean level of performance remained the same between
periods ( m, =A* a ) could be tested against an alternate
hypothesis that the level of training improved ( n f < \i2 ) .
If the statistical test allows the acceptance of the
alternate hypothesis that the mean levels of performance
within the random sample have risen, i.e. \k% > \it , then it
can be assumed that the MOE averages are rising and the
level of combat proficiency in the Army is improving.
This is overall an exciting concept, because for the
first time Army training progress could become verifiable,
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and the increase in large unit skills documented. This is
in no way possible now with the AHTEP systea of evaluation.
The A3TEP systea has long contributed to the aouse of
readiness reports (readiness condition levels) due to its
subjective nature. Using the TRP, it may now become
possible to accurately reflect Army-wide readiness levels.
As this aethodclogy for X analysis is keyed to the
baseline lata set, it would be impossible for the moment to
determine individual unit readiness from the NTC. However,
trend anaysis as previously described may yield a linkage
between SOS values and unit readiness, and thus readiness
conditons could be evaluated by the SIC results. This is
probably not advisable, however, as this converts any NTC
exercise into a defacto test. Thus, in order to preserve
the NTC as a training ground, any assessment of readiness
levels should be restricted to an Army-wide basis.
This problem not withstanding, if desired readiness
goals can be linked MOE X values by judicious analysis (or
by arbitrary decision based on senior officer combat
experience) , a powerful assessment tooi has been created for
the Any Staff. 3y observing the trends and viewing the
progress of the Army as reflected in the baselnne data set,
the Chief of staff and other senior Army leaders could gain
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a much more concrete and reliable assessment of Army
capabilities. This path holds much promise for future
analysis.
2 . T-score_ Analysis
The T-score has been utilized in the TRP as a
vehicle for reflecting equal intervals of ability. This
system is not critical in providing the commander with a
normative evaluation. Simple deciles, calculated from the
raw data could suffice for that purpose. 19 The T-score,
however, provides a major benefit in the analysis of the
resulting data. The most powerful of all statistical tests
are the parametric tests. These tests often require the
assumption of normality, that is, that the samples be drawn
from a normal population. The T-score conversion
automatically transforms all data distributions to a normal
(50,10) distribution. This allows the application of most
parametric tests, as all samples can now be considered to be
drawn from a normal distribution. Additional convenience is
afforded by the fact that the standard deviation is
transformed to a fixed value (10) for all MOEs and this
allows several powerful comparison tests to be used.
l9 This assumes that the problems addressed in Chapter 4
do not occur, i.e. sparseness of data and synergistic "test
problem" effects. See Chapter 4, section A (4).
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Thus, parametric tesxs concerning means can be
employed to conduct trend analysis [Ref. 31: pp. 390-396].
The effect of NTC training can thus be verified by the
hypothesis testing of MOE means to see if they are
increasing (at an appropriate significance level) . The
differences between MOE means can also be tested to see if
some particular combat skills, as measured by the MOE, are
being learned better than others. The application of these
tssts to TRP data (T-scores) can pay big dividends in
increased understanding of the combat process, which is
beneficial to combat development agencies, and better
understanding of the effects of the NTC training on unit
performance.
One of the biggest advantages of the use of T-
scores, however, is in regression and correlation analysis.
As all MOEs are distributed identically after undergoing the
T-score transformation, the techniques of multiple
regression analysis can be utilized to examine the
interrelationship of the MOEs. This analysis could not only
include correlation analysis to determine MOE




Multiple regression could be used to link MOE
performance to combat mission outcome. In order to do this,
define mission accomplishment as a function that is
determined by the values of the MOE T-scores. The
particular model represented by the data, i.e. linear,
quadratic, etc. , could be investigated to determine the true
relationship of various MOEs to mission accomplishment.
Thus, by using standard regression techniques on the
NTC data base over a sufficient period of time, it would be
possible in theory to determine for the first time the
empirical relationship of MOEs (or skills) to mission
outcome. This sort of study is absolutely impossible under
the current ARTEP system for reasons outlined in Chapter 1.
This analysis is normally only done by combat developments
agencies at great expense. It could now be done at no
additional expense to the Army on a routine basis. This
analytic effort would in no way. affect the training unit or
interfere with its operations. Using the TRP as a medium it
allows for analysis of the combat process to a degree never
before attainable, and could conceivably greatly affect
future Army operations and training.
Other techniques, of course, also have much to
offer. To investigate sets of MOEs to determine
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relationships chi-square contingency tables could be
employed. Two MOEs could be contrasted by appropriately
subdividing the TRP T-scores into categories and casting a
selection of data from the baseline set into contingency
tables. These tables could be tested for significance and
thereby, MOE relationships examined for their contribution
to the mission outcome. As an example of this, "percent
planning time forwarded" (PPTF) could be contrasted with
"percent friendly personnel survived" (PFPS) to see, if
indeed, "haste makes waste". Many other such analyses are
possible
.
Standard analysis of variance (ANOVA) techniques can
be applied to the T-scores to wring even more information
out of them. There is no limit to the interactions and
relationships that can be investigated between the various
MOEs. The T-score does not hold much to offer the unit
commander directly, but it contains a wealth of data for the
analyst. Yet for all of its usefulness, the T-score is
obtained almost painlessly through the TRP structure.
Without the TRP, much useful data is absolutely wasted. By
employing the TRP, a whole universe of combat developments




3 . Nonpa rametric Analysis
Earlier in this chapter a method was described by
which the OC inputs of a subjective nature could be scaled
into a "harder" number and employed in a TEP. This system
is workable and allows an otherwise "fuzzy" rating scheme to
be included in the TRP. The OC rating in itself, however,
possesses a great deal of usefulness in its present form.
The behavioral sciences have long drawn conclusions from
data which is just as subjective. This has been
accomplished through the use of nonparametric statistical
analysis which is essentially "distribution free" and often
not encumbered by the necessary assumption of normality as
the parametric tests require. Such statistics are just as
fitting in this instance, for the OC is, in essence, doing
what many clinical psychologists do in the course of an
experiment: he is evaluating human interaction and
performance.
The scaling methods of Lindsay [ Ref . 30] provide OC
data on an interval scale. The interval scale is
sufficiently well-defined to permit the application of
standard parametric tests in the analysis of data [Ref.
27:pg. 62]. This may not, however, be desirable or feasible
once actual data is obtained. An in-depth analysis of
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actual OC evaluations would be necessary before statistical
inference techniques could be applied. At the time of this
writing, the NTC instrumentation has been installed only one
month. Therefore, it is impossible to find the actual
distribution and reliability of OC input data. Hence, if it
is felt that parametric tests are not suitable for this
transformed data, nonparametric alternatives are available.
This suggested program is mostly directed toward
determining training progress. That is, these nonparametric
tests would be most useful in determining if progress has
occurred. Two tests are suggested as a basic beginning, and
the applicability of other nonparametric tests is limited
only by the skill of the analyst.
In turning to nonparametric test theory, it is
assumed that the battalion command group/staff evaluation is
unchanged from mission to mission. That is, the functioning
of the commander and staff is assumed to be a constant
process no matter what operation is being conducted. Each
mission might reguire some different specific task to be
performed by the unit, but the functioning of the staff
element will fellow the same basic procedures. If this is
the case, then differences in the OC evaluation from the
first mission evaluated to the last mission evaluated will
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reflect the amount of learning or increase in training
proficiency attained by the command/staff element.
In order to assess this, several nonparametric tests
for two related samples (i. e. the battalion command
group/staff performance at two different times) can be
employed. The McNemar test for the significance of changes
[Ref. 27:pp. 63-67] can be used for this purpose. In this
test each person or item (here, the battalion command
group/staff) serves as its own control. The test would take
the first evaluation and compare it to a later, subsequent
evaluation. In this manner an increased level of training
would be shown if the difference in the evaluation ratings
received was deemed significant at the chosen level.
An even more powerful test to use in this situation
would be the Wilcoxon matched- pairs signed-ranlcs test. This
test almost requires an interval scale, but not quite. 20 The
test fully uses all the information available in the data.
It is ideally suited to determining the before-and-after
effect of events, and could accurately reflect the
improvement in the battalion command group/staff operations
due to training at the NTC. This test could be employed by
2 °See Siegel [Ref. 27: pg. 76] for a complete explanation
of test requirements. Siegel discusses an "ordered metric"
scale, which falls between the ordinal and interval scale.
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using the thirty OC evaluation MOEs as sample items, and the
values of the MOEs for the first and subsequent (or last)
evaluations as the before-and-after conditions. For a
detailed discussion of the actual technique, see Siegel
[Ref. 27:pp. 75-83]
Of course, many other nonparametric tests could be
applied to the NTC data, both instrumented and OC-input.
Such analysis would not only reflect the value of NTC
training, but also help to justify future expansion through
more incisive cost effectiveness analyses. Nonparametric
ANOVA can also be used to examine the relationships of
either OC MOEs or instrumented MOEs by determining
interactions. It might even be possible, in future
training, to structure data for fractional factorial
analysis and thus begin an in-depth look at the interactions
of the complex combat processes. This information could
prove to be extremely valuable to combat developments
activities by helping to clarify the key interactions of
unit skills on the battlefield.
The NTC is not a test bed, but rather an instrument
for accomplishing realistic training. Several statistical
methods have been presented here using the TEP structure as
a basis. It should be noted that these methods require no
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interference with the training unit, and all analysis can be
done any time after the completion of an exercise. This
system, utilizing the TRP as its heart, allows for exciting,
significant analysis of all data without increasing the
reguirement for additional controllers.
The point to be noted here is that the TfiP serves as
a vehicle for this analysis, in addition to its already
meaningful role as a training evaluation and resource
allocation aid. Thus, the TRP has been shown to be a useful
device not only to assist in training evaluations, but for
combat developments, Army trend analysis and even future




VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDAT IONS
The Nation, and the Army, have expended a great deal of
effort, time, and money in establishing the National
Training Center. The realistic training environment at the
NTC could serve to greatly increase the Army^ combat
readiness and improve the chances of survivability in any
future conflict. Before these benefits can be realized,
however, the NTC must produce a valid and thorough
evaluation of unit training performance. It is these
evaluations— evaluations of training standards for large
units— that assist commanders in identifying unit training
weaknesses. Resources can be allocated to training
weaknesses and remedial training accomplished only after all
shortcomings are clearly identified. The desired result,
therefore, is to gain the maximum benefit from limited
training resources and produce an Army that performs at a
high level of combat proficiency.
An attempt has been made here to examine the current
Army training system from its inception to its application
at the National Training Center. This examination has
focused on the area which presents today's training manager
with the most difficulty—the evaluation (and indirectly the
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establishment) of training standards for large units. This
is a problem of great difficulty, and has not -been properly
addressed in recent times.
The creation of the NTC has spurred efforts in this
field, and has resulted in an almost revolutionary
breakthrough in the training process. The instrumented
battlefield will present, for the first time in Army
history, a realistic training ground where the synergistic
effect of modern Army weapons can truly be evaluated. It
will, indeed, provide unit commanders with a statistically
reliable, objective training evaluation. Traditional ARTEP
feedback processes and AAE*s as planned for the NTC do not
fully capitalize on this fact.
A. CONCLUSIONS
The Training Readiness Profile attempts to capitalize on
the statistically reliable data gathered by the NTC. The
NTC is a revolutionary, not evolutionary, step forward. As
befits such a system, the TRP is proposed as a methodology
for use there. The TRP employs a method previously unused
in Army training programs. It is believed that this unique
methodology addresses a number of current training problems
fully--and takes maximum advantage of the NTC's objective,
statistically reliable data. The TRP will allow the NTC to
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realize its full potential, and recognizes that the q uality
of evaluation provided to the training unit is of key
importance.
The TRP, by virtue of its structure, accrues the
following benefits through its use:
It provides a simple, reliable, easy-to-understand unit
training evaluation. It eliminates "telephone book"
sized ARTEP evaluations and dreary statistics.
It provides an almost wholly objective (machine driven)
training evaluation, without possible human subjective
bias or prejudice.
It alleviates the problem of determining large unit
subtask standards (a prodigious effort in itself) by
utilizing a normative evaluation.
It allows meaningful evaluation without resorting to
grades, and does so in an almost cheat-proof way--by
evaluating an entire unit at once.
It assists commanders, both NTC and unit, in setting
standards for scenarios by clarifying issues of
performance.
It literally provides defacto standards, and easily
allows for judgmental standards to be inserted.
It facilitates Army-wide training level standardization
by illuminating "Army performance" through the baseline
data set, and communicates this "peer performance" to
the unit commander. Thus, it tells him what other
battalions are capable of.
It illustrates complementary weaknesses in training and
can help tc highlight the interactive effect of training
deficiencies in combat.
It provides to the unit commander a solid guide for
allocating training resources, by defining (through
normative evaluation) the worst areas of unit
performance--those that need more training.
It does not usurp command authority and, indeed, still
requires the commander to make allocation decisions and
examine his unit' s training status in detail.
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It holds great potential for combat developments
analysis rt as isn without extensive data modification or
additional data collection.
It can be used as a tool for assessing Army-wide
readiness by clearly portraying training trends and
levels of capability.
It has a great deal of flexibility inherent in the
system and possesses unlimited potential for expansion
and further application in several fields.
It allows the National Training Center to realize its
full potential by not only organizing data for unit
presentation and use but also by allowing combat
developments work to proceed apace simultaneously with
training, without mutual interference.
These extensive and valuable benefits are available simply
by implementing the Training Readiness Profile at the NTC.
In the preceeding chapters two forms of evaluation have
been discussed; the subjective standard evaluation and the
objective, normative or relative performance evaluation.
Analytically, the normative evaluation works best at the
present time. Start-up problems inherent in any complex
operation such as the NTC will render arbitrarily fixed
standards irrelevant in short order if they are not based on
a normative assessment of what is really happening on the
instrumented training area. Long term analysis will be
necessary to effect the formulation of such fixed standards
[Ref. 14:pp. III-9 to 111-11]. The NTC neither has this
analytic capability at present, nor is it likely to acquire
any in the near future as trained operations research
analysts (specialty code 49) are not planned or projected
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for assignment to the NTC in quantity. An in-depth analysis
of NTC operations will be necessary to assess realistic
scenario standards, and in the interim (or even permanently)
the normative evaluation process is perfectly acceptable.
Both normative and fixed standard evaluations may prove
useful in the long run with neither supplanting the other.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are made for improving the
operation of the National Training Center.
1 • Imple ment the Tra ining_Readiness Pro file
To assist commanders in identifying training
weaknesses the TRP concept should be implemented at the NTC.
The TRP should be used by the commander with the assistance
of the training analysis and feedback (TAF) personnel for
direcring efforts to determine specific training weaknesses.
The relative comparison between MOEs should be used when
prioritizing the allocation of training resources. The
implementation of the TRP should be a matter of high
priority to insure that the maximum training benefits (as
outlined above) are availible to all units training at the
NTC as soon as possible.
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2 . Establish NTC /TSH Analysis Cell
Currently, there are no operations research analysts
assigned to the NTC section at Ft. Monroe, the agency
responsible for the continuing development of the NTC. To
provide assistance in the design and growth during the
expansion phases of the NTC an operations analysis cell
should be assigned to the TRADOC Systems Manager (TSM)
office at Ft. Monroe. The analysis cell or group would
provide the capability to structure and orient the
instrumentation equipment package so as to maximize the
benefits of producing unit training evaluations.
3 • Establish an NTC Analysis Cell
A group of qualified analysts should be assigned to
the NTC to assist with the process of sorting and organizing
data obtained from the instrumented battlefield at the NTC.
Much of the current analysis applicable to the NTC has been
accomplished by operations research analysts assigned to
other organizations. This has increased the workloads of
these "parent" organizations (such as CATEADA) while
introducing almost insurmountable problems of distance and
time into all analysis produced. These personnel could also
conduct the independent trend analysis necessary to revise
the base of MOEs and recommend the updating of standards.
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Additionally, the data base at the NTC will prove to be a
valuable source of information for many Army agencies. When
this data is made available to these organizations, chances
are very great that they will want access to the data base
and reguest assistance in retrieving selected sections of
the data. Operations research analysts present at the
source of this data could prove to be a very cost effective
investment for the Army, as it would increase the chances of
reguestors obtaining the right data the firs t time it is
reguested, and it would insure that researchers understand
the sources and limitations of all such information. In
this way, coordination between the NTC and combat
developments agencies would be of a high order.
The TRP program needs acceptance. There is no
avoiding the hard fact that realistic combat training
evaluation is absolutely necessary if the Army is to fight
and win the next war. The TRP is suggested with the goal of
attempting to assist the professional unit commander in
improving his unit training. It does NOT compare units, but
rather helps the unit commander see "how far he has to go".
It must be utilized for what it is worth, and accepted in




The implementation of these recommendations will
enhance not only the quality of training at the National
Training Center (through better feedback), but insure that
the instrumented data gleaned by this system is most
effectively utilized. In war, a soldier*s duty is clear,
and the tasks he must undertake are before him. In peace,
the soldier can only train for war as he thinks it will be.
The realism of that training in peacetime is the key to the
soldier's success in wartime. The ultimate in training
realism is now before the OS Army at the NTC. There is no
other facility like it at this time, in the world. It must
be employed in such a way as to assure the maximum benefit
possible to our troops that train there. To do otherwise,
wastes the resources of the Nation.




LIST OF TRAINI NG MISSIONS PLANNED FOB THE NTC
The following is a list of tactical missions planned for
training units at the National Training Center. These
missions fall into two categories: those missions considered
to be so important that all training units will execute them
while at the NTC f and those other missions which the unit
commander can choose to execute or not according to his
unit's training plan. Missions identified by an asterisk
are considered to be most important.
Movement to Contact *
Hasty Attack *
Deliberate Attack *
Defend in Sector *
Defend from a Battle Area *
Hasty Defense *
Delay in Sector *
Disengagement *
Counterattack *
Defend a Battle Position *
Deliberate Defense
Reconnaissance and Security
Create and Defend a Strongpoint
A series of scenarios of varying intensity will support each
of these missions. These packages will be used by the NTC
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Operations Group to conduct training and provide orders to
training units in a rapid and standardized manner. [ Ref
.




DEFINITION OF ELEMENTS OT.ILIZED IN THE TOP-DOWN ANALYSIS
PROCEDURE
The following definitions were utilized in accomplishing
the top-down subtask analysis for the National Training
Center and are taken from Reference 14, page III-5 and
III-6.
1. Missions. A clear, concise statement of the overall
purposes of a system.
2. Tasks, (also comprised of any number of subtasks) .
Objectives which must be accomplished to satisfy the
mission.
3. EEAs. Essential Elements of Analysis. These are
subcategories of the tasks which lend themselves to
analysis. The EEA's should be derived from these tasks to
cover all the significant aspects of the force unit*s
mission. Thus each EEA must relate to one or more tasks.
U. MOEs. Measures of Effectiveness. Quantitative
indicators of the general ability of a military force to
accomplish an assigned task or mission under a specified
set of conditions (must address EEAs)
.
5. MOPs. Measures of Performance. Quantitative measures
of the ability of a particular subunit or weapon system to
accomplish a particular task. MOPs may be combined to
compute MOEs or may address one or more EEA directly.
6. Data. Facts or statistics that provide descriptive




EXAMINING THE COMBAT PROCESS: THE TOP-DOWN A NALYSIS
The first step taken in the sequence of events was the
identification of EEAs. Drawing from AfiTEP 71-2 [Ref. 6],
and FM 71-2 [Ref. 16 ], a basic list of combat missions was
established, listing in order of importance the combat
missions which could be assigned to the heavy task force
[Ref. 32:Incl 2]. This prioritized list was then sent to
the TRADOC schools to allow them to begin considering MOEs
and MOPs to be utilized in evaluating unit training at the
NTC. The recommended methodology used in this process was
identical to what has already been described, and reflected
the hierarchy of Figure 8 [Ref. 32:Incl 3].
Determining the EEA did not prove to be an easy task.
The initial NTC Development Plan gave the responsibility for
the top-down analysis of combat tasks to the TRADOC combat
development community [Ref. 14:pg. III-5 ]. This task
devolved upon the Combined Arms Training Development
Activity (CATRADA) at Ft. Leavenworth, who began analysis on
the EEA/MOE/MOP structure. The final EEAs were drawn from
their logical source: Army doctrine as specified for the
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heavy task force in FM 71-2, The Tank and M echanized
Infantry. B attalion Task Force [Ref. 16]. In specifying how
to organize and operate a heavy task force, FM 71-2 utilized







Fire Support [Ref. 16:pg. 3-11]
To this was added the commanders interface system of C 3--
Command, Control, and Communications. These 7 systems
became the BEA for the NTC, to which an eighth system, NBC,
was later added. This analysis, taken directly from current
Army doctrine, formed the basis from which the MOE/MOP
development proceeded.
In the long run these EEA must be considered the best
choice. The initial list of EEA proposed bore little
resemblance to the hierarchy specified by Figure 8. Those
topics as originally proposed were overlapping, or in many
cases a function of one another. Some proposed SEA were, in
fact, subsets of one another. FM 71-2 states that:
"Although it is true that the actual fighting is done by
members of companies, it is the battalion and its





This demonstrates that doctrinally the battalion operations,
as directed by the battalion commander, are the heart of the
combat process. In fact, the task force is the major
application of combined arms fighting ability in warfare
today:
"...the battalion is the level which combines the various
arms tactically on the terrain and brings its combined
combat powers t.o bear on the enemy." [ Ref . 16: pg. 3-2]
Therefore, any EEA which purport to interactively provide an
assessment of mission accomplishment or unit performance
must center around the organized application of combat power
by the battalion commander. Indeed, this is the primary
goal of the NTC
:
"At the NTC the primary target of evaluation and
corrective training will be the battalion's ability to
orchestrate the application of total combat power." [Ref.
14:pg. 1-5]
Thus, it is difficult to conceive of a selection of EEAs
that would be meaningful if they did not center around the
battalion's operations. Indeed, as these EEA are drawn
directly from Army doctrine, any MOE/MOP analysis based upon
them must inherently contain the necessary subtasks for a
proper training evaluation. As these EEA reflect the
battalion's ability to integrate the systems at the disposal
of the battalion commander, they will reflect accurately
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unit performance once mission accomplishment (outcomes) are
determined, for:
"Tactically skillful commanders have battalions which
optimize their effectiveness and minimize their
vulnerabilities, and thus habitually execute their
missions successfully with minimum losses." [Ref. 16:pg.
3-2]
It is upon this solid framework that the MOE/MOP structure
is built. The work done by CATHADA and the service schools
in determining the quantitative HOEs and MOPs to be applied
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IDENTIFYING JJE MEASURES OF JRAINI NG PERFORMAN CE
In initially considering the problem of identifying MOE
for use at the NTC the above philosophy seems innocuous
enough, but it was soon discovered that accurate MOE were
difficult to come by. No one had ever dealt with the
battalion level combat process to such an introspective
degree before. In tackling the problem at CATRADA, a
slightly modified MOE development methodology was posited
[Ref. 20]. The same hierarchy as demonstrated in Figure 8
was utilized, but in the analysis of the eight EEA efforts
were focused on the six interrogatives:
"The three categories (EEA's^OE^, and MOP«s) can be
thought of as answering the questions where, when, wh<
who, why, and how." [fief. 2Q:pg. 25]
and the analysis process followed that of Figure 20.
This enabled the CATRADA analysts to compile an initial
breakdown of subtasks for the eight EEA which were
subsequently organized by the NTC system contractor, Science
Applications Incorporated (SAI) , of El Paso, Texas, into the
first compendium of MOEs/MOPs, entitled National Tra ining
C^H^er: EEA'
s
, MOE ' s, MOP 1 s [Ref. 33]. This represented -he
"first cut" of ideas regarding what the NTC subtask analysis
176

Where? (In what functional
subsystem is the analyst
dealing?) « -
—
What? (What was the performance
of a subsystem?)
MOP's 1*2 are measureable items which
can contribute directly to an MOE.
MOP 3 is a yes/no irem which feeds
directly to the EEA but which







1. How many cues (smoke, dust, vehicle)
were available to enhance OPFOE
detection capability?
2. How many OPPOR aircraft were engaged
at maximum effective range?
3. Was mutual support provided between
fpnsp units?air de e e
4. etc.
j
Figure 20: CATHADA MOE Development Methodology
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should contain, and were based initially on the experience
and judgment of the military officers doing the analysis.
Bith the additional analytical efforts of SAI, the
development of 30E/M0P proceeded apace. The next draft of
MOE/MOP contained the first analysis of the original CATRADA
work restructured in terms of manual or instrumented
information retrieval systems. Entitled Com bat Evaluation
£l22I^a (SEA' s, MOE^s, MOP's) [Ref. 34], this document
related the subtasks of Reference 33 to the level of unit
(platoon, company, or battalion), type of information
retrieval system (manual or instrumented) and stage of
development of the NTC at which the MOE would be introduced
to the system. This subtasking process was identical to the
method employed by ARI in the structure of the REALTRAIN
validation studies [Refs. 8,9,10,11] and represented
accepted state-of-the-art analysis of the combat process for
the heavy task force.
As SAI began closer integration with the efforts of UID-
CATRADA it became obvious that the subtasking analysis was a
mammoth task.
"In order to address the large number of SOE's
characterizing Combined Arms force on force exercises...
Systematic analysis is required to avoid "getting lost in
the woods" of the combat details. Further, it is
necessary for the AAR preparers to have a systematic
interpretation procedure so as to provide sufficient
comparative data so as to diagnose and guide maximal
corrective action. [Ref. 35: pg. 2-2]
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The level of detail, if carried to its extremes at the
lowest echelons of a unit, threatened to overwhelm any
evaluation or feedback system, for combat is simply a very
complex, highly synergistic process. Gradually the concept
of a "hierarchy of detail" or "fineness of grain" was
implemented in the analysis. The analysis was:
"...organized in a systematic fashion utilizing the
experience: "what happened and when it happened." They
provide for fine grain understanding of where "things went
wrong" and the desired type of corrective action." [Hef.
35:pg. 2-2]
This concept supported the top-down analysis and enabled SAI
and CATRADA to focus the evaluation. Given that the HTC
would be structured with limited funds and resources, the
entire spectrum of battalion combat operations could not be
evaluated to the fine grain desired. Therefore, the
continuing analysis for the NTC was structured as follows
(see Figure 21) :
"Starting with the core actions at the FEBA t the mostimportant SEA relate to maneuver. This is further
supoorted by each of the concurrent seven EEA areas. As
indicated, the analysis will proceed from the core actions
out to the supporting EEA*s such as Intelligence and
Counter-intelligence." [fief. 35:pg. 2-3]
The rationale for this procedure was:
"Detail will focus on the FEBA as represented by 3LUEF0R
and OPFOR actions and reactions. This represents the
primary NTC objective of combat, command, and personnel
training in a relative environment.
Timing— Maneuver measures occur in seconds and meters
while Intelligence/Counter Intelligence measures occur in
hours and kilometers, thus the fine grain detail of combat
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Figure 21: The STC Combat Evaluational Structure
critical events of maneuver must be considered prior to
the longer term events from an analysis and interpretation
viewpoint.
The amount of command impacts in required 80E* s are
?reatest in maneuver and decrease through the subsequent
evels of SEA analysis." [Hef. 35:pg. 2-3]
This technique allowed the process of MOE/MOP development
and system integration to proceed and culminated in the
published Interpretive Guide to the NTC combat evaluation
program [3ef. 35] which delineated all MOEs and their
subordinate 30Ps to be considered at the MTC.
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This procedure has resulted in what has to be the most
complete indexing to date of the tasks and subtasks involved
in battalion task force combat. Under the development plan
of the NTC, however, these MOE/MOP are not to be regarded as
fixed but rather as initial analysis efforts. Throughout
the future operation of the NTC these MOE/MOP will be
subject to revision as the training battalions provide more
and more information regarding the task force combat process
[Ref. 14:pg. III-9 to III- 11].
Therefore, the combat evaluation program may rightly be
regarded as incomplete. It represents, however, the best
efforts of military judgment to dissect the task force
combat process. This program compares favorably to most
other analyses of this nature [Refs. 36,37]. The analysis
is prodigious in its content, and although all aspects of it
cannot be quantified under the physical limitations of the
NTC, it provides a "base case" analysis and identifies the
most critical items to be quantified. These MOE/MOP are
truly an accurate state-of-the-art reflection of the combat




THE QUANTIFICATION OF TACTICAL PERFORMANCE
The initial MOE/MOP development has followed a lengthy,
complicated process and it is recognized that these measures
should be reviewed on a recurring basis. Any need for
improvements, refinements, and changes will hopefully become
apparent through repetitive analysis of the selected MOPs.
The importance of these MOPs cannot be overstated since they
provide the underlying reason why specific performance
criteria are being quantitatively measured by the
instrumentation system. The entire instrumented environment
at the NTC has been designed for the purpose of recording
those specific events and occurrences in the engagement
simulation exercise that are necessary to evaluate the
training standards for large units— the key problem.
Data collected by the Core Instrumentation Subsystem
(CIS) comes from two sources: the instrumented environment
which automatically sends objective measures at designated
time intervals, and field observer/controllers (FO^s, or
later OC's) who input subjective comments and information
periodically as the situation dictates.
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A. AUTOMATIC DATA FROM THE INSTRUMENTED ENVIRONMENT
This environment consists of a complex interface that
combines voice and video recording with other telemetry to
provide certain measured data to the CIS. This data is
manipulated and filed so that it represents an accurate
portrayal of the combat activities that transpired during an
exercise. The actual quantifiable items being measured are
outlined below.
1 . Positio n Loca tion
Every instrumented player will have his location
measured in UTM coordinates, using metric system units, each
30 seconds. If he has moved less than 16 meters since the
previous update the move is considered insignificant and is
not recorded. The measured data will be filed by time
sequence and individual player item identification [Ref.
18: pg. 3-14]. As an aid to map coordinates there are six
video teams that will be assigned to various sectors of the
battlefield. Film of actual locations and surrounding
terrain will provide enhanced insight into actual field
positions and will reflect the use of available terrain
features for cover and concealment. Knowing the exact
locations of players allows movement distances and ranges
between various players to be accurately computed.
183

2. Weap_ons Firing/Effects Event
When a weapon is fired by an instrumented player a
series of information is automatically recorded: time of
firing, identification of firer, and his location. When a
simulated round impacts on or near an instrumented player
similar information is recorded: time of impact,
identification of the target player, and his location. As
these events are recorded by the CIS a time coincidence
algorithm is activated which attempts to establish a pairing
between a firer and a target. If a weapons pairing is
satisfactorily confirmed the recorded information is updated
to reflect the pairing action and the result of the
engagement i.e. near miss, hit, or kill. Since player
identifications are assigned prior to exercise commencement
che type of weapon system firing and the type of target hit
are known from these events. (For a more detailed
discussion of the pairing process refer to section 3.2.2.2,
Ref. 18:pg. 3-15.) From these recorded events numerous data
items can be compiled. The number of rounds of ammunition
fired by individual weapon system type, the number of enemy
targets of various types hit and/or killed, engagement
distances between firers and targets, the current status of
each force (i.e. number of players alive by weapon type),
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and many other such objective data values are easily
calculated. Existing instrumentation at the NTC is
programmed for these and other calculations.
3 . Communication Keying Event
When an instrumented radio set transmits a message
the beginning and ending time of the transmission is
automatically recorded. This allows for the computing of
the number and duration of transmissions by radio set [Ref.
18:pg. 3-18]. Additionally, selected radio nets will be
recorded and/or monitored to allow for analysis of radio
message content if desired. This will be helpful in
disclosing communication security (COMSEC) violations or
evaluating operators for proper radio procedure.
B. DATA FROM OBSERVER/CONTROLLERS (OC«S)
Observer/Controllers (OC^s) will be detailed to each
unit down to the platoon level for the purpose of observing
all aspects of a heavy battalion's combat operations. They
will use ARTEP 71-2 for performance comparison when
conducting evaluations or providing information to the CIS
or subseguent feedback to the evaluated unit.
"The purpose of the ...OC. ..is to provide timely, on-the-
scene inrormation (made as accurate as possible through




Certain actions within the various levels of activity are
not suitable for direct instrumented collection. For
example, no instrumentation can indicate whether or not the
commander used available battlefield intelligence in
developing his plan of operations. The OC's will serve as
the collection source for this type of unquantif iable data
[Ref. 38:pg. 1-12].
Prior to commencement of an exercise phase each OC will
be given a selected list of elements of information (EI)
which he must provide to the CIS. These 21 come from a
developed listing of approximately 200 items that cover such
areas as target acquisition, manuever, fire support, command
and control, logistics, administration, and others. The OC
will conduct his subjective evaluation based on current
doctrinal publications and transmit his report to the CIS.
The evaluations can be in the form of a nominal measure
ranging from to 9 or alternately a free format message
describing the situation [Ref. 18: pp. 3-25,3-26].
A good example of the OC and CIS interface is provided
by the use of indirect fire. When the CIS is notified that
indirect fire is being aimed at a unit the computer provides
time, location of impact, number and type of rounds to be
fired and the expected casualties produced based on the
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recorded information about position locations. This
information is relayed to the OC who marks the fires on the
ground and then uses his own judgement and expertise to
determine, if in fact the expected casualties did occur.
The OC then provides the CIS with actual combat casualties
and takes appropriate action to designate the killed players
by deactivating their MILES equipment with his controller
key device. It is obvious that the OC input has a direct
influence on data collected in this type of engagement. All
OC input is tagged so if a particular individual is
considered to have rendered improper assessments a
correction is possible.
In developing an objective training evaluation the use
of subjective inputs from OC*s is highly questionable. The
affect of indirect fire casualty assessments and some other
activities, however, must necessarily be incorporated into
the battle outcome data as no other system exists to
simulate these combat effects. Thus, in the scheme of
evaluating training standards, the OC's will play an




THE GENERATION OF STATISTICAL EVALUATIONS
Presented in the previous section is the actual data
being collected by the instrumentation ax the NTC. The list
of items measured appears to span only a limited array of
the activities planned for the NTC exercises. However, a
thorough, imaginative eye will note that the data being
collected provides the information necessary to conduct an
extensive objective training evaluation. These collected
data items can be manipulated and aggregated to generate
useful information in many different forms. This appendix
will be devoted to explaining how these data items can be
utilized to provide an objective evaluation of unit tactical
performance for the training exercises at the NTC.
A. GENERAL PROCEDURE
At the beginning of an exercise each instrumented player
is matched with a designated identification code. Any data
that is collected concerning a player will be stored in his
unique player history file (PHF) ; this includes weapon
firings, movement, change in status from alive to killed,
etc. When an event occurs the data describing that event is
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recorded and stored in the appropriate PHFs. To facilitate
the aggregation of data by units (platoons, companies, etc.)
each player is assigned to a specific tactical unit. A
listing of identification codes for all members belonging to
a unit is maintained in the CIS for reference and for
sorting data. During an exercise, players may be cross-
attached to adjacent elements. When this occurs all
subseguent activities concerning that player will be
credited to the new unit.
Since participating units in the NTC exercises are
comprised of many diverse weapon system types, i.e.
dismounted infantry, tanks, various types of anti-tank
weapons, mortars, artillery, etc., it is desirable to have a
method of comparing the "combat power" capability of two
opposing units. Military planners and operations analysts,
for at least thirty years, have used various "firepower-
score" approaches for aggregating the diverse combat
capabilities of a heterogeneous military force into a single
number that measures combat power. Each weapon type is
assigned a score or weighted effectiveness index (WEI) that
represents its combat potential and the combat power of a
unit is obtained by summing the scores of all live players
belonging to that unit and forming the weighted unit value
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(WOV) [Ref. 39: pp. 85-86]. THADOC has provided a listing of
numbers referred to as the WEI/WOV table to the NTC (see
Figure 22) , and this is stored in the CIS master file to
supply the firepower scores necessary for computing the
combat power of units.
The NTC instrumentation is currently programmed to
compute and update selected statistics every five minutes
for a maximum of 50 units. Each platoon, company, and
battalion is considered a separate unit. For example, a
battalion consisting of only 3 companies with 4 platoons in
each company would be a total of 16 units; i.e. 12 platoons,
3 companies, and 1 battalion. The statistics are aggregated
upward through every echelon. The instrumentation is
flexible and can accomodate reorganization of entire units.
All statistics computed following a change in unit
organization will incorporate those players who currently
belong to the designated unit. The data, and subsequent
computed statistics, are compiled for each exercise segment.
Exercise segments are event driven and can last from 4 to 48
hours with an average duration of about 8 to 12 hours. The
segments ars delineated by: natural engagement breaks; a
changs in tactical mission; moving to a new terrain area; a
change in environmental conditions; or a command decision.
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These are the weighted values used at the NTC,





















































Figure 22: Weights for Computing Unit Scores
Since each segment presents a different situation to the
training unit it seems appropriate to consider each segment
as a separate evaluation of the unit performance [Ref.
18:pp. 3-11 to 3-27],
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All recorded data items are objective numbers that can
be used in various mathematical operations to generate a
truly objective measure of unit performance. The MOEs/MOPs
developed by CATRADA provide the basis for constructing a
unit evaluation. If the HOEs/MOPs were to change in the
future, then the recorded data would be altered to a
different format to provide a new objective measure. The
NTC instrumentation is programmed for expansion in phases
over the next few years. As the instrumented system grows
the number and variety of statistics available for
computation can be increased accordingly.
B. THE STATISTICAL REPRESENTATION OF MO ES
The ultimate purpose of the NTC instrumentation is to
record data for use in providing a training evaluation to
the heavy task force. To achieve this end, the MOE/MOP
structure developed jointly by CATRADA and SAI had to be
translated into calculable statistical entities. This
difficult process was conducted over a long period of time
on an ad hoc basis 21 between the two agencies, and resulted
in the player tactical performance kernel statistics
21 Per conversations with Rich Scaggiioni, SAI La-Jolla,
CA, and Norma Perez, SAI-El Paso, IX, in November and
December of 1981. This interfacing process between the
contractor, SAI f and the developing agency, here CATRADA,
was not documented in writing.
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[Ref. 40:pg. 3-22 to 3-26]. The major areas addressed by
the statistics include: overall engagement effectiveness,
movement, weapon effectiveness, and communications. These
statistics provide quantitative measures of unit performance
in each of the specified areas, and currently serve as the
objective base that supports the training evaluation
provided to each unit.
1 • Overall Engagement Effectiveness
The statistics generated in this category provide a
general overview of the unit's ability to accomplish its
assigned mission. The following numbers will be computed
each update period for both the friendly and the OPFOR
units.
Number of casualti es— A count of the number of
instrumented players killed.
Overall force valu e— The sum of the combat power for
live players belonging to that unit. The combat power
is obtained from the WEI/WUV table stored in the CIS.
Overall force value loss meas ure—Total combat power
lost by the unit during that update period.
Z2£2ii La. contact measure-"When a pairing event between
a firer and a target is recorded, the platoons to
which these players are attached is considered to be
in contact. The measure will be the total number of
platoons in contact (each platoon will only be counted




Force engagement measure- -When a pairing event occurs,
the firer weapon will be considered engaged. The
total force engaged on each side will be the sum of
combat power engaged (each player counted only once
for an update period). [Ref. 40:pp. 3-22 to 3-23]
2 . Movem ent
The following statistics represent the unit's
ability to maneuver on the battlefield. These statistics
can be used to provide an indication of how well the unit
used available terrain, whether or not an adequate route
reconnaisance was performed, etc. Alone, these numbers are
not very useful in conducting a training evaluation, but
when coupled with other information, such as overall
engagement effectiveness, they provide an insight to
possible deficiencies. Each number will be computed for
both the OPFOR and friendly units for each update period.
E§.1§ °£_ advance--The center of mass of each unit will
be computed based on the locations of players
belonging to the unit. The distance between beginning
and ending center of mass points divided by the length
of time between updates will produce this average rate
of advance value.
&§&£ of ad2.12.ce 12 ward, a destination- -The distance of
unit movement projected on the line from the unit's
center of mass to a manually designated objective




The ability of soldiers to properly and efficiently
use their weapon firepower in combat is a viral necessity
for survival. However, being effective with weapons does
not ensure success on the battlefield; success is achieved
through the proper integration and utilization of several
combat skills. The statistics in this area dc provide an
effectiveness measure for weapon employment. They can be
used to evaluate marksmanship capability, to determine if
soldiers are estimating distances correctly before directing
fire at a target, etc. Numbers of this type provide
measures that can be used to evaluate key areas of overall
unit performance. Every number will be computed each update
period.
E2HH^§ fired—The number of rounds fired by each
instrumented weapon type for both friendly and OPFOR
units. A cumulative number of rounds fired by each
friendly unit for tank main gun and coax, TOW, Dragon,
and Viper. A similar cumulative count for OPFOR
Sagger, tank main gun and coax. One firing message of
the coax will be considered 100 rounds.
Firing rasuits— The number of near misses, hits, and
kills by friendly units with tank main gun and coax,
TOW, Dragon, and Viper against OPFOR targets of tank,
BMP and 3RDM-2. The associated cumulative values for
the engagement segment will be maintained.
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gatio of f iring results— The ratio of total firings to
near misses, hits, and kills by friendly unit for tank
main gun and coax, TOW, Dragon, and Viper and a
similar ratio for Sagger, tank main gun and coax OPFOE
weapons.
£§§22H fra ct ional kill effectiveness- -The total value
(from the WEI/WUV table) of opposing players killed by
tank main gun and antitank weapons (TOW, Dragon, and
Viper for friendly and Sagger for OPFOE) divided by
the total value of opposing players killed.
H§§E2H engagement range— The range from a weapon to
the target in a pairing event, by weapon effect (near
miss, hit, kill) for tank main gun and antitank
weapons (TOW for friendly and Sagger for CPFOE) . A
cumulative frequency count will be collected in 15
range intervals of 200 meters each.
Mean kill range--The average distance between friendly
and OPFOR tank main guns and antitank weapons (TOW and
Sagger) when a vehicle kill was obtained. [Eef.
40: pp. 3-23 to 3-24 ]
4 . Communication s
A unit* s ability to effectively employ radio
communications has an important impact on battle outcome.
The following statistics can be used to support and
identify suspected training deficiencies reported in the
unit evaluation.
Number of communications—The number of radio
transmissions initiated during the update period.
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iklirage, transmission duration— Average length of all
radio transmissions for that period as well as the
average duration of transmissions during the entire
engagement segment. These average durations will be
computed for each unit as well as aggregated to an
overall BLUEFOR and OPFOE average duration.
Significant transmissions— Total number of
transmissions exceeding 25 seconds, but less than 55
seconds. Total number of transmissions lasting 55
seconds or longer. [Ref. 40: pp. 3-24 to 3-25]
These statistics represent the final culmination of the
Combat Evaluation Program initiated at CATRADA to support
the NTC. The exhaustive top-down analysis of the heavy task
force combat process yielded a series of EEA, MOE, and MOP
which were translated into computer hardware and software by
SAI f and the resulting structure of evaluation as it exists




CURRENT LIMITATIONS OF QUANTIFICATION
Every operation, no matter how detailed or complex, is
designed to perforin specific functions. With meticulous
effort devoted to operational design numerous functions are
possible, but there will always be some cut-off point or
limit where the effort must end. The NTC instrumented
environment is an example of such a complex operation.
Following the extensive MOE development, considerable effort
was directed toward the evaluation process itself. Since
the planners were restricted to using "off-the-shelf"
instrumentation and were held to a relatively short
preparation time, initial work has been devoted to
quantifying those data sources deemed most crucial to
assisting a heavy battalion task force in identifying
training deficiencies.
The paramount objective of the NTC is to provide a
realistic environment to facilitate combat learning and
evaluate a unit's ability to survive and accomplish its
mission. The NTC instrumentation has been oriented toward
collecting data in support of the combat activities that
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occur within the span of the participating soldiers, and it
does this exteremely well. Real time casualty assessment
with MILES and other core instrument systems provide a
fairly thorough coverage of the critical tactical events of
the engagement simulation exercises. The quantitative
measures, as outlined earlier, provide the information
necessary to reconstruct "what, when, and where" for the
analysis of tactical events. This represents a major
accomplishment over the current system of subjective
training evaluations. However, there are aspects of the
combat process that are neglected. These areas are the
combat activities that do not impact directly on the
learning of the participating soldiers. A discussion of
these areas is provided only to illustrate the limitations
of the NTC.
The EEAs for the NTC have been displayed pictorially as
shown in Figure 21. One can see from this Figure that the
EEA form concurrent rings -chat emanate outward from the
forward line of troops (formerly refered to as the FEBA)
.
This is to indicate that the crucial EEA which impact most
on a battalion task force evaluation begin at the site of
the battle. When a friendly unit maneuvers against a
thinking OPFOR capable of counter moves a learning process
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results. Activities occurring further away from the battle
site are important in the sequence of combat learning, but
the impact is not immediately felt by the participating
soldiers. These more distant EEA require additional time
and examination to determine their impact on the battle
outcome and thereby produce any degree of benefit to combat
learning. Thus, they are less crucial to analysis as
performed at the NTC.
Since the quantification of combat activities at the NTC
had to be somewhat restricted, only the most crucial areas
could be covered by instrumentation in the initial phases of
NTC development. As very aptly put,
"Maneuver measures occur in seconds and meters while
Intelligence / Counter Intelligence measures occur in
hours and kilometers, thus the fine grain detail of combat
critical events must, be considered prior to the longer
term events from an analysis and interpretation
viewpoint." [ Sef . 35:pg. 2-3]
Using this rationale, the initial instrumentation at the NTC
has been directed toward collecting data in support of the
"close-in" SEAs which include: maneuver, fire support,
mobility/counter mobility/survivability, and air defense.
The major limitations of the NTC instrumentation therefore
fall under the headings of the four outer most EEAs of
Figure 21, which are: combat service support, nuclear,
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biological, and chemical (NBC) , command, control, and
communications (C 3 ) , and intelligence/counter intelligence.
The limitation of the instruments to provide specific
guantifiable measures to support the evaluation of these
outer EEAs is well recognized. Field observer/controllers
(OC) are directed toward gathering information and data
needed to evaluate these areas. The training analysis and
feedback (TAP) personnel monitor all collected data and then
search for the cause of identified training deficiencies, in
an attempt to relate this essentially unguantifiable data to
the mission outcome.
Thus, in any further discussion of the evaluation of
training standards, an important point to consider will be
what impact these limitations have on the task force
evaluation. The purpose of the NTC, once again, is to
provide a realistic combat environment. The instrumentation
package can now accurately display the tactical combat
events which occur during engagement simulation exercises.
The TAF and OC personnel will assist the unit commander and
his staff in identifying what they suspect as training
deficiencies, but it is ultimately the responsibility of
each commander and his staff to determine the cause of those
weaknesses. With the after action reviews and diagnostic
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take-home package provided to the unit by the NTC, it should
be able to conduct remedial training at its home station and
identify the appropriate deficiency that caused a particular
problsm, without the use of NTC instrumentation.
These system limitations have been recognized and
efforts are being made to reduce them. The NTC is being
expanded in phases over the next few years. As more time
and money are made available the instrumentation
capabilities will become more sophisticated, and a broader
spectrum of data will be collected. Much effort has been
davoted to analyzing the complexity of the combat process.
When these details can be accurately developed to represent
the soldiers actions then more specific MOEs/MOPs can be
selected for measuring by instruments. Finally, the EEAs in
the outer rings of Figure 15 are not completely
guantifiable; the data necessary to measure the performance
in these areas is not well defined. Until the "fuzzy area"
of what exactly is intelligence/counter intelligence or C 3
,
(and how they should be evaluated) is established, these
areas cannot be accurately quantified.
The major point to be made is that the NTC instrumented
environment possesses certain limitations. The
instrumentation is collecting data to support EEA deemed
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most crucial for evaluation of tactical combat events near
the site of the battle, and this it does well. The SEA that
represent longer term activities are not currently
adequately quantifiable. There are sources at the NTC aad
at home stations to assist in evaluating unit performance on
these SEA; the realistic battlefield at NTC is not crucial
in producing an evaluation of them. Limitations of the NTC
instrumented environment are recognized and during the
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